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Take What You Can, Give Nothing Back:
Judicial Estoppel, Employment Discrimination,
Bankruptcy, and Piracy in the Courts
THERESA M. BEINER* & ROBERT B. CHAPMAN**
Mullroy: What's your purpose in Port Royal, Mr. Smith?
Murtogg: Yeah, and no lies.
Jack Sparrow: Well, then, I confess, it is my intention to
commandeer one of these ships, pick up a crew in Tor-
tuga, raid, pillage, plunder and otherwise pilfer my
weasely black guts out.
Murtogg: I said no lies.
Mullroy: I think he's telling the truth.
Murtogg: If he were telling the truth, he wouldn't have
told us.
Jack Sparrow: Unless, of course, he knew you wouldn't
believe the truth even if he told it to you.'
I. INTRODUCTION
At first glance, piracy and bankruptcy do not appear to have much
in common. Except, of course, what might be considered the obvious.
Depending on one's tendency to accept either the "myth of the immoral
* Nadine H. Baum Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock,
William H. Bowen School of Law.
** Visiting Associate Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law. The authors would
like to thank Vincent Kalafat, Anne Lawton, Joshua Silverstein, and Elizabeth Warren for their
valuable comments on earlier drafts of this article; to thank John Finnis, Nicole Garnett, and Jay
Tidmarsh for helpful conversations; and to thank the faculty members at the University of
Pittsburgh Law School and Notre Dame Law School who participated in faculty colloquia at
which this paper was presented.
1. PIRATES OF THE CARIBBEAN: THE CURSE OF THE BLACK PEARL (Walt Disney Pictures
2003) [hereinafter PIRATES].
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debtor"2 or the myth of the "debtor as victim,"3 one might say that con-
sumer bankruptcy permits individuals to engage in a bit of piracy. It
allows individuals to acquire Gucci purses and Prada shoes,4 to "eat at
the pizza parlor on Friday night,"5 to commit sexual assault,6 and to
receive necessary medical treatment,7 all without paying the full price or
even paying anything at all. In short, bankruptcy allows debtors to
"raid, pillage, plunder and otherwise pilfer [their] weasely black guts
out."8
There is, however, another form of piracy occurring as a result of
bankruptcy. Some debtors' employers are using judicial estoppel to
deprive debtors of their employment related claims and deprive creditors
of possible recovery. Judicial estoppel, an old and arguably outdated
court-created procedural tool, relegates parts of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and Bankruptcy Code to the status of guidelines rather
than actual rules. Because of judicial estoppel, employers are getting
away with acts of discrimination, creditors are missing out on opportuni-
ties to be repaid, and employment discrimination victims are losing their
day in court.
While occasionally a debtor loses a tort or contract claim as a result
of bankruptcy-related judicial estoppel, often the claims they lose are
employment discrimination claims. In addition to experiencing what
some describe as the general judicial hostility toward employment dis-
crimination plaintiffs,9 bankruptcy debtors, who are also employment
2. ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE Two-INCOME TRAP: WHY MIDDLE-
CLASS MOTHERS AND FATHERS ARE GOING BROKE 71-95 (2003).
3. F.H. Buckley, The Debtor as Victim, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1078 (2002).
4. Daniel McGinn, Maxed Out, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 27, 2001, at 34, 37. But see Elizabeth
Warren, What Is a Women's Issue? Bankruptcy, Commercial Law, and Other Gender-Neutral
Topics, 25 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 19, 47 (2002) (questioning the stereotype that frivolous spending
on designer brands is one of the factors leading to bankruptcy).
5. Lynn M. LoPucki, Common Sense Consumer Bankruptcy, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 461, 464
(1997).
6. See Solomon v. Cosby (In re Solomon), 67 F.3d 1128, 1130 (4th Cir. 1995).
7. See, e.g., Melissa B. Jacoby, Collecting Debts from the Ill and Injured: The Rhetorical
Significance, but Practical Irrelevance, of Culpability and Ability to Pay, 51 AM. U. L. REv. 229,
235-38 (2001).
8. PIRATES, supra note I.
9. Recent scholarly debate has focused on judicial hostility toward employment
discrimination claims and civil rights claims generally. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J.
Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, J. EMPIR. L. STUD.
429 (2004); Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Anti-Plaintiff Bias in the Federal
Appellate Courts, 84 JUDICATURE 128 (2000); Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Models and Trial
Outcomes in Civil Rights and Prisoner Cases, 77 GEo. L.J. 1567 (1989).
However, very little scholarly attention has been paid to the use of judicial estoppel in
relation to bankruptcy cases in particular. Nevertheless, these cases have not escaped the attention
of commentators on bankruptcy. See, e.g., James D. Walker, Jr. & Amber Nickell, Judicial
Estoppel and the Eleventh Circuit Consumer Bankruptcy Debtor, 56 MERCER L. REv. 1115
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discrimination plaintiffs, are living under circumstances that make them
even more vulnerable in many ways than the average employment dis-
crimination plaintiff. And like employment discrimination plaintiffs,
bankruptcy debtors are disproportionately women and minorities. For
example, African Americans make up a disproportionate percentage of
debtors,' 0 households with children are more likely to experience bank-
ruptcy than childless households, 1 i and most individuals filing bank-
ruptcy are women who depend on their jobs to climb their way out of
financial distress. 2 Indeed, more than one million women file for bank-
ruptcy each year. 13 Furthermore, as evidenced by their bankruptcies,
most debtors are strapped financially, which creates a strain on both
themselves and their families. If they, like ordinary employment dis-
crimination plaintiffs, are also falling prey-to this anti-plaintiff bias, it is
likely to hurt them - and their creditors - in ways that are different from
other employment discrimination plaintiffs.
Some commentators have criticized statistical studies purporting to
find such anti-plaintiff bias. For example, in response to such studies,
two commentators have stated that an accusation of judicial bias against
plaintiffs "involves a substantive assessment[, which] cannot be made
without first looking at what litigants have presented to the courts and
then looking at what the courts have relied upon in rendering their
decisions."' 4
(2005); Lisa Chang, Defending Employment Discrimination Claims When the Plaintiff Has Filed
for Bankruptcy, 30 EMP. REL. LAW J. 75 (2005); James D. Walker, Jr. & Amber Nickell,
Bankruptcy, 55 MERCER L. REV. 1101, 1104-08 (2004); Louis M. Phillips & Brandon A. Brown,
Continuing Ruminations on Judicial Estoppel: Barging into the Consumer Field, 2 NORTON
BANKR. L. ADVISER 4 (2004); Donna T. Snow, The Eleventh Circuit Takes Another Look at
Judicial Estoppel and Gets it Right, 7 NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER 3 (2004); James D. Walker, Jr.
& Amber Nickell, Bankruptcy, 54 MERCER L. REv. 1351, 1353-57 (2003); Robert F. Hershner, Jr.,
Eleventh Circuit Review, 3 NORTON BANK. L. ADVISER 11 (2003); Recent Development,
Disclosure of Causes of Action in Bankruptcy Proceedings after Ex Parte First Alabama Bank, 27
AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 197 (2003); Robert B. Chapman, Bankruptcy, 53 MERCER L. REV. 1199,
1205-19 (2002).
Nor has the development been completely lost on commentators in labor and employment
law. See, e.g., Peter Reed Corbin & John E. Duvall, Employment Discrimination, 55 MERCER L.
REv. 1175, 1185-86 (2004); Peter Reed Corbin & John E. Duvall, Employment Discrimination, 54
MERCER L. REV. 1435, 1445-46 (2003); Benjamin A. Hardy, The Bankrupt's Employment Claim -
List it or Lose it, 18 LAB. LAW. 193, 194-99 (2002).
10. Robert B. Chapman, Missing Persons: Social Science and Accounting for Race, Gender,
Class, and Marriage in Bankruptcy, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 347, 385 (2002).
11. Elizabeth Warren, The New Economics of the American Family, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REV. 1, 1 (2004).
12. Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy: The New Women's Issue, AROUND THE KITCHEN TABLE,
Mar. 2005, at 2, 2, http://www.demos-usa.org/pubs/kitchentableissue4.pdf.
13. Id.
14. Harry T. Edwards & Linda Elliott, Beware of Numbers (And Unsupported Claims of
Judicial Bias), 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 723, 723 (2002) (responding to Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore
20051
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
This article is an attempt to provide, at least in part, such an assess-
ment. It examines employment discrimination cases, brought by indi-
viduals who have also filed for bankruptcy, in which district courts have
accepted or declined the defendant's invitation to dismiss or to grant
summary judgment based on omission of that action in a previous bank-
ruptcy filing. Many courts have accepted this invitation and have dis-
posed of cases before reaching the merits. This article explores the
rationales of some trial and appellate courts in reaching their formal out-
comes. Although invoking judicial estoppel in such cases may be sup-
ported by precedents, doing so requires the district court to disregard
many fundamental rules of bankruptcy law and federal civil procedure.
Because we undertake no quantitative analysis, the most we can suggest
is that some federal judges reach an anti-plaintiff outcome that does not
square with well-settled substantive and procedural rules.
A methodological and conceptual disclaimer as to empirical claims
and formalist analysis is perhaps in order. Eisenberg and Clermont,
along with other empiricists, offer what may be characterized as an
empirical hypothesis purporting to show bias as a cause of outcomes in
discrimination cases. Edwards and Elliott suggest that the outcome of
discrimination actions can be explained by reasons."5 We must
acknowledge the vexed relationship between a hypothesis of cause and a
statement of reasons, which is the source of not inconsiderable confu-
Eisenberg, Appeal from Jury or Judge Trial: Defendants'Advantage, 3 Am. L. & ECON. RaV. 125
(2001), and Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 9).
15. A few examples illustrate. Note that Edwards and Elliott seek to determine whether the
bias is "unprincipled." Edwards & Elliott, supra note 14. They criticize Eisenberg's and
Clermont's method because "the data upon which [they] rely include absolutely nothing about the
issues raised by the parties before the appellate courts (nor the issues that were raised in trial and
then dropped or waived on appeal); the quality of advocacy on appeal; or the appellate courts'
bases for the decisions rendered in the cases that are included in the study." Id. at 726. They
focus on the rules of the game: That defendants generally appeal law and plaintiffs usually appeal
facts, which involves different standards of review. Id. at 728. And they argue that the anti-
plaintiff hypothesis should have included consideration of data on the following question: "Do
defendant/appellants more often rely on viable legal claims than plaintiff/appellants when seeking
appellate review?" Id. at 730. A strict legal realist, who accepts that law is only a prediction of
what the courts will do, would insist that a verified study of win-rates conclusively answers that
question.
[Vol. 60:1
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sion in jurisprudence, 6 philosophy,17 and psychology.' 8
Whether a hypothesis as to a cause is a good one is shown by
whether the hypothesis allows accurate prediction. A reason is a good
reason, on the other hand, if it corresponds to a general standard for
what constitutes a good reason.19 Accepting the premise that a hypothe-
sis of causes and a justifying reason are of two different orders (are, in a
manner of speaking, two separate language games), Edwards' and Elli-
ott's invocation of reasons does not refute (and may not even directly
address) Eisenberg's and Clermont's hypothesis. Although there may be
good reasons, efficient causes, and understandable motives for introduc-
ing reasons, a reason for a judicial outcome does not contradict a
hypothesis as to its cause; however, there is something to Edwards' and
Elliott's point that an empirical examination of judicial outcomes is
unsatisfying if it does not take account of the rule-following and reason-
giving nature of the judicial process.2"
16. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 135-37 (1961).
17. See, e.g., Wilfrid Sellars, Actions and Events, 7 Noos 179, 189-90 (1973). Compare, e.g.,
Donald Davidson, Actions, Reasons, and Causes, 60 J. PHIL. 685, 693 (1963) ("A primary reason
for an action is its cause.") with GILBERT RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF MIND 115 (1949) ("[W]e should
not swallow the traditional stories about the occult antecedents of either deliberative or impulsive
actions."). See generally Abraham Roth, Reasons Explanations of Actions: Causal, Singular, and
Situational, 59 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 839 (1999); Daniel Hutto, A Cause for
Concern: Reasons, Causes and Explanations, 59 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 381 (1999).
18. See, e.g., JACQUES BOUVERESSE, WrITIGENSTEIN READS FREUD: THE MYTH OF THE
UNCONSCIOUS 69-82 (Carol Cosman trans., 1995).
19. This is not the place to elaborate, with purported exactness, on the relationship between
the two. We must suffice with what should be the uncontroversial distinction drawn by
Wittgenstein:
There are two senses of "reason": reason for, and cause. These are two different
orders of things. One needs to decide on a criterion for something's being a reason
before reason and cause can be distinguished. Reasoning is the calculation actually
done, and a reason goes back one step in the calculus. A reason is a reason only
inside the game. To give a reason is to go through a process of calculation, and to
ask for a reason is to ask how one arrived at the result.
ALICE AMBROSE & MARGARET MACDONALD, WiTrGENSTeIN'S LECTURES: CAMBRIDGE 1932-1935
4 (Alice Ambrose ed., 1979); accord id. at 28; LUDWIG WrrGENSTEIN, PmLOSOPHICAL
INVESTIGATIONS § 325 (G. E. M. Anscombe trans., 2d ed. 1958); LUDWIG WrrTGENSTEIN, THE
BLUE AND BROWN BOOKS 15 (1969). A reason is verified through "possible recognition ... by
the interested party." BOUVERESSE, supra note 18, at 72.
20. Consider a short parable, in the form of a variation on § 630 of the Philosophical
Investigations: Imagine that we are watching a gymnastics class, in a waiting room from which
we can see the instructor and pupils but not hear anything that is said. There is an instructor near
the pupils and his mouth is moving. The pupils move in certain ways, generally making very
similar movements more or less simultaneously. We derive a non-falsified hypothesis that
accurately predicts what moves the pupils will make. Assuming the pupils have mastered the
technique of rule-following and the gymnastics techniques in which they are being instructed, and
are employing that mastery, our hypothesis will equally predict what instructions the instructor
calls out as what bodily motions the pupils will make. If we state our hypothesis in terms of bias
(e.g., "the pupils show a systematic bias in favor of the fouett") a pupil may very well justify her
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
This article attempts neither to prove nor disprove the hypothesis of
bias. Rather, it has the more modest aim of examining the justifications
offered for the outcomes in a sliver of employment discrimination
actions; it concludes that the rule-following and reason-giving functions
in these cases do not measure up to the conventional standard for rule-
following or reason-giving. Whether or not a hypothesis can be refuted
non-empirically, by a recitation of good reasons, these bankruptcy-based
judicial estoppel cases by and large lack good reasons and leave the
hypothesis unaffected as a hypothesis.2"
Whatever the merits or demerits of bankruptcy-based judicial
estoppel as the reasons behind judicial decisions, the beauty of judicial
estoppel from an employer's perspective is that it allows the employer to
win an employment discrimination case before the court reaches the
merits of the claim. Generally used to protect the integrity of the courts,
judicial estoppel prevents parties from taking contradictory positions
before two different courts. In the context of bankruptcy, judicial estop-
pel normally arises when a debtor fails to list on his or her bankruptcy
schedules a potential employment discrimination claim against a current
or former employer. Sometimes that "claim" is only a pending charge
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). Other
times, the debtor has already filed a lawsuit. In still other cases, the
debtor files a claim after the bankruptcy discharge. Whatever the factual
circumstances, savvy employment lawyers have realized that a failure to
list such a potential or actual claim on a schedule in a bankruptcy case
gives rise to an argument that the debtor cannot now assert such a claim
in a subsequent lawsuit. Lawyers for defendant employers therefore
argue that because the debtor has failed to include the claim on a list of
assets the debtor swore to be complete, the debtor must not "own" any
such claim. Thus, the debtor is judicially estopped from making such a
claim, and there is one less case on the court's docket.
While one can see the potential benefits of judicial estoppel for
movements with reference to the instructions. The justification does not falsify the hypothesis. It
could be objected, however, that the hypothesis proceeds on ignorance of misunderstanding of the
"game" the instructors and pupils were playing; or that, assuming the pupils had mastered the
technique of rule-following and the gymnastic techniques demanded by their instructor, the
hypothesis would be equally correct whether it attributes bias to the pupils, the instructor, or the
rules of their game. This objection is another way of saying the hypothesis, even if it always
predicts the pupils' movements, is unsatisfying as an interpretation. Indeed, when one of the
authors presented this problem to his seven-year-old niece (Elizabeth Chapman) after her
gymnastics class, she dismissed the hypothesizing but helpfully suggested that an account of the
instructions would assist in interpreting the activity: "I could tell you afterward."
21. If the pupils in the preceding footnote systematically failed to follow the instructions, and
assuming (still) that they were competent gymnasts and rule-followers, the instructions could not
be said to provide reasons for their moving as they did and a hypothesis as to why they moved as
they did - and what caused the failure within the game - would become especially interesting.
[Vol. 60:1
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defendant employers and for the courts, there is more than one resulting
loser, and often the alleged "wrongdoing" was nothing more than an
unwitting mistake. Most bankruptcy debtors who fall into this trap are
not sophisticated litigants. They rely heavily on the advice of their
bankruptcy counsel or the paralegal that assisted in preparing the sched-
ules. However, some courts have inferred an intent to deceive in cases
in which a debtor failed to list a potential claim, even if the debtor's
bankruptcy attorney advised against disclosing it. Even if a more legally
sophisticated and culpable plaintiff might be estopped rightfully in cer-
tain cases from proceeding inconsistently, this still leaves creditors with
unpaid debts. However, the concerns of the creditors are not even men-
tioned in many of the cases. Additionally, successful invocation of judi-
cial estoppel creates a windfall for the defendant employer, further
undermining the remedial policies underlying Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act and related anti-discrimination laws. Finally, the courts that
dismiss these cases have a limited economic view of the litigation. They
assume that employment discrimination cases are only about money.
However, the plaintiff often has suffered dignitary harm and simply
wants her day in court to tell her story. Therefore, it may be erroneous
to invoke judicial estoppel even if the debtor is a "really bad egg" with
the worst of motives. By using judicial estoppel to end these cases,
courts and employers are acting in a rather pirate-like manner, robbing
creditors of their assets and employment discrimination plaintiffs of
their claims with a resulting windfall for alleged wrongdoers.
Part II of this Article provides a brief overview of Chapter 7 and
Chapter 13 bankruptcy under the United States Bankruptcy Code. Next,
Part III of this Article looks at how employers have successfully used
judicial estoppel to stop bankruptcy debtors from pursuing employment
discrimination claims against them. In contrast, this part also describes
cases in which the courts have concluded that the debtor is not estopped.
In addition, this part looks at two related procedural tools-standing and
the real party in interest rules-that defendants have likewise used,
although with less success, to prevent debtors from pursuing their
employment discrimination claims. Part IV of this Article discusses
how the use of judicial estoppel is contrary to several rules and policies
that are considered fundamental to bankruptcy law. For example, this
part discusses how bankruptcy law already has its own procedures that
adequately deal with debtors who fail to disclose all their claims on their
bankruptcy schedules. Next, Part V of this Article looks beyond bank-
ruptcy law to explain that there are still other procedures, such as joinder
of the trustee, that render the use of judicial estoppel unnecessary.
Finally, Part VI of this Article explains how the prevalent use of judicial
estoppel may be yet another example of the general trend of judicial
20051
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hostility towards employment discrimination claims, and Part VII of this
article provides concluding remarks.
II. BACKGROUND ON BANKRUPTCY
This article is concerned with two types of bankruptcy under the
United States Bankruptcy Code: Chapters 7 and 13.22 Chapter 7 bank-
ruptcy is designed to collect all of the debtor's assets as of the date the
petition is filed so that they can be liquidated and the money distributed
to creditors.2 3 Once the petition is filed, the debtor's assets, including
pending and accrued causes of action, become property of the estate, and
the trustee is the real party in interest with respect to those assets.24 The
debtor has an affirmative duty to disclose all such assets on his or her
bankruptcy schedules, which are filed with or shortly after the petition."
A few months after the case is commenced, the court usually enters
a discharge. Objections to the discharge must be filed within sixty days
after the first date scheduled for the meeting of creditors.26 If there is
neither an objection to the discharge, nor a motion to dismiss the case,
nor a pending request to extend the deadlines for either, an individual
debtor who has paid the required fees is entitled to a discharge.27 The
debtor may request that the entry of discharge be postponed for up to
thirty days.28
Because causes of action are property of the estate, only the Chap-
ter 7 trustee in bankruptcy has standing to pursue them. The asset
becomes part of the estate unless the trustee abandons the asset, at which
point it returns to the debtor.29 Thus, if a trustee abandons a cause of
action because he does not believe it is meritorious or worth the cost of
22. See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-84 (2000) (discussing Chapter 7 bankruptcy); id.
§§ 1301-1330 (discussing Chapter 13 bankruptcy).
23. See id. §§ 704(1), 726.
24. See id. § 541(a)(1).
25. Id. § 521(1). Because pirate booty was shared in a common pool, disclosure was also
central to the various semi-fictional pirates' codes recited by Daniel Defoe. For example, in the
code of Captain John Phillips:
If any Man shall offer to run away, or keep any Secret from the Company, he shall
be marroon'd with one Bottle of Powder, one Bottle of Water, one small Arm and
Shot.
If any Many shall steal any Thing in the Company, or game, to the Value of a Piece
of Eight, he shall be marroon'd or shot.
DANIEL DEFOE, A GENERAL HISTORY OF THE PYRATES 342 (Manuel Schonhom ed., J.M. Dent &
Sons 1999) (1724).
26. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4004(a). The meeting of creditors must be held between twenty and
forty days after the order for relief. FED. R. BANKR. P. 2003(a).
27. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4004(c)(1).
28. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4004(c)(2).
29. 11 U.S.C. § 554 (a)-(c).
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litigation, the debtor is once again free to pursue that claim in his or her
own right. However, if a debtor fails to list an asset on his or her bank-
ruptcy schedule, that asset still belongs to the estate.30 At the close of
the bankruptcy estate, an asset that a debtor fails to schedule cannot be
abandoned (and, of course, was not administered by the trustee, who did
not know about it), and therefore remains property of the estate.3
Chapter 13 functions differently. Under this chapter, a plan is con-
firmed to repay the debts, and the debtor is obligated to make payments
pursuant to the plan.3" When those payments are completed, the debtor
is discharged and is no longer under any obligation to pay any additional
amounts that might be owed on those debts.33 Unlike Chapter 7 debtors,
Chapter 13 debtors are under a continuing obligation to disclose assets
during the pendency of their petition,34 and they remain in possession of
their assets before and after confirmation. Thus, some courts have
held that "chapter 13 debtors have concurrent jurisdiction with the chap-
ter 13 trustee to litigate claims. 36
Bankruptcy courts can reopen a bankruptcy post-discharge under
certain circumstances. Section 350(b) of the Bankruptcy Code permits a
court to reopen bankruptcy cases, including those under Chapters 7 and
13, 3 7 "to administer assets, to accord relief to the debtor, or for other
cause." 38 The courts have held that such a decision falls "within the
sound discretion" of the bankruptcy court.39 The determination of cause
to reopen a bankruptcy case is necessarily a fact-specific determination
based on the particular circumstances of the individual case.40 Some
courts have held that the lower court's failure to reopen a bankruptcy
case to administer newly discovered assets can amount to an abuse of
discretion.4 However, if the chances of recovery are remote or not
worth the risk, the court need not reopen a bankruptcy case.42 In consid-
ering whether to reopen a bankruptcy case, courts consider three inter-
30. Mobility Sys. & Equip. Co. v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 233, 236 (Fed. Cl. 2001).
31. Id.; see 11 U.S.C. § 554(d).
32. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1325-26.
33. Id. § 1328(a).
34. Id. § 1306.
35. Id. § 1327(b).
36. Travelers Indem. Co. of Ill., Inc. v. Griner (In re Griner), 240 B.R. 432, 435 (Bankr. S.D.
Ala. 1999).
37. 11 U.S.C. § 103(a).
38. Id. § 350(b).
39. Rockland Trust Co. v. Sheerin (In re Sheerin), 21 B.R. 438, 439 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 1982).
40. In re Koch, 229 B.R. 78, 88 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1999); In re Winebrenner, 170 B.R. 878,
881 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1994).
41. E.g., Lopez v. Specialty Rests. Corp. (In re Lopez), 283 B.R. 22, 27 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
2002); see Mullendore v. United States (In re Mullendore), 741 F.2d 306, 308 (10th Cir. 1984).
42. Lopez, 283 B.R. at 27.
2005]
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ests: "1) the benefit to the debtor; 2) the prejudice or detriment to the
defendant in the pending litigation; and 3) the benefit to the debtor's
creditors. 43 Some courts have concluded that the third factor, benefit to
the creditors, is the most important one in the analysis.'
1II. JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL AND BANKRUPTCY
Jack Sparrow: Me? I'm dishonest, and a dishonest man
you can always trust to be dishonest. Honestly. It's the
honest ones you want to watch out for, because you can
never predict when they're going to do something
incredibly ... stupid.45
Will Turner: You didn't beat me. You ignored the
rules of engagement. In a fair fight, I'd kill you.
Jack Sparrow: Then that's not much incentive for me to
fight fair, then, is it?
4 6
Will Turner: You cheated.
Jack Sparrow: [shrugs] Pirate.4 7
The courts developed judicial estoppel "'to protect the integrity of
the judicial process' by 'prohibiting parties from deliberately changing
positions according to the exigencies of the moment.""' As the Fifth
Circuit has explained, the doctrine protects the courts "by 'prevent[ing]
parties from playing fast and loose with the courts to suit the exigencies
of self-interest.' ",49 Bankruptcy courts, in particular, "rel[y] on the rep-
resentations of the debtor with respect to whether he or she has claims or
interests arising out of the matters before the court."50 If the debtor uses
43. In re Rochester, 308 B.R. 596, 601 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2004) (citing In re Koch, 229 B.R.
at 85-86; In re Maloy, 195 B.R. 517, 518 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1996)).
44. See, e.g., id. at 600.
45. PIRATES, supra note 1.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749-50 (2001) (citations omitted).
49. Browning Mfg. v. Mims (In re Coastal Plains, Inc.), 179 F.3d 197, 205 (5th Cir. 1999)
(quoting Brandon v. Interfirst Corp., 858 F.2d 266, 268 (5th Cir. 1988)). The phrase "fast and
loose" recurs in opinions about judicial estoppel. The phrase has nothing to do with the plaintiff
being racy or promiscuous. See Tamara R. Piety, Something Fishy: Or Why I Make My Students
Read Fast-Fish and Loose-Fish, 29 VT. L. REV. 33, 37-38 (2004) (explaining the many definitions
of the word "fast"). Rather, the phrase, which dates to the sixteenth century, referred originally to
a "cheating game" associated with gypsies. 5 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 750 (2d ed. 1989).
The game was "played with a stick and a belt or string, so arranged that the spectator would think
he could make the latter fast by placing a stick through its intricate folds, whereas the operator
could detach it at once." Id. (quoting JAMES 0. HALLIWELL, A DICTIONARY OF ARCHAIC AND
PROVINCIAL WORDS, OBSOLETE PHRASES, PROVERBS AND ANCIENT CUSTOMS, FROM THE
FOURTEENTH CENTURY (1847)). From this literal meaning, "fast and loose" obtained the
figurative meaning of inconstancy, shiftiness, or slipperiness.
50. Brassfield v. Jack McLendon Furniture, Inc., 953 F. Supp. 1424, 1432 (M.D. Ala. 1996).
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the bankruptcy courts to receive bankruptcy relief and then "utilizes the
judicial system to pursue claims he or she had previously misrepresented
or failed to reveal, the debtor commits a fraud upon the courts and will
be estopped."'
In New Hampshire v. Maine, the United States Supreme Court set
out the general circumstances under which judicial estoppel is appropri-
ate in federal cases:
"[W]here a party assumes a certain position in a legal proceeding,
and succeeds in maintaining that position, he may not thereafter, sim-
ply because his interests have changed, assume a contrary position,
especially if it be to the prejudice of the party who has acquiesced in
the position formerly taken by him."52
While the Court explained that there was no general formula for apply-
ing judicial estoppel, there are "several factors [that] typically inform the
decision," including:
First, a party's later position must be "clearly inconsistent" with its
earlier position. Second, courts regularly inquire whether the party
has succeeded in persuading a court to accept that party's earlier
position, so that judicial acceptance of an inconsistent position in a
later proceeding would create "the perception that either the first or
the second court was misled." Absent success in a prior proceeding,
a party's later inconsistent position introduces no "risk of inconsistent
court determinations," and thus poses little threat to judicial integrity.
A third consideration is whether the party seeking to assert an incon-
sistent position would derive an unfair advantage or impose an unfair
detriment on the opposing party if not estopped.53
The Court acknowledged that judicial estoppel is a flexible doc-
trine, and "[a]dditional considerations may inform the doctrine's appli-
cation in specific factual contexts."54 Other courts have added a note of
caution: "[j]udicial estoppel is strong medicine ... and it should not be
used where it would 'work an injustice, such as where the former posi-
tion was the product of inadvertence or mistake.'-"5
In the context of bankruptcy schedules, some courts have devel-
oped a slightly different set of judicial estoppel factors. In particular,
they have effectively eliminated the third element of New Hampshire v.
Maine - whether the plaintiff would derive an unfair advantage or
impose an unfair detriment on the defendant. The Fifth Circuit uses
51. Id.
52. New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 749 (quoting Davis v. Wakelee, 156 U.S. 680, 689 (1895)).
53. Id. at 750-51 (citations omitted).
54. Id. at 751.
55. Fairchild v. Touchtunes Music Corp., No. 01-C9699, 2002 WL 31833768, at *2 (N.D. Ill.
Dec. 12, 2002) (quoting In re Cassidy, 892 F.2d 637, 642 (7th Cir. 1990)).
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three factors: (1) "the position of the party to be estopped is clearly
inconsistent with its previous one"; (2) "the party convinced the court to
accept the previous position"; and (3) "the party to be estopped must
have acted intentionally rather than inadvertently. 56 The Eleventh Cir-
cuit boils it down to two factors: "'[flirst, it must be shown that the
allegedly inconsistent positions were made under oath in a prior pro-
ceeding. Second, such inconsistencies must be shown to have been cal-
culated to make a mockery of the judicial system.'-5
While these elements do not appear impossible for a truly unwitting
debtor to overcome, some courts in practice have been unsympathetic to
what appear to be honest mistakes by debtors. This may well be the
result of a rather hard-line position taken by the Fifth Circuit in In re
Coastal Plains,58 a case that has become very influential in this area. In
Coastal Plains, the court elaborated on the difference between "inten-
tional" and "inadvertent" in this context, explaining that, "in considering
judicial estoppel for bankruptcy cases, the debtor's failure to satisfy its
statutory disclosure duty is 'inadvertent' only when, in general, the
debtor either lacks knowledge of the undisclosed claims or has no
motive for their concealment."59 An analysis under Coastal Plains inev-
itably leads to the conclusion that all debtors have a motive for conceal-
ment. After all, if a debtor conceals a claim, she can pursue it for herself
without sharing the proceeds with creditors. Thus, all debtors who omit
a claim from their schedules will satisfy this element. In addition, the
Coastal Plains court held that the reliance of the defendant on the non-
disclosure was irrelevant to the court's analysis of whether to apply judi-
cial estoppel; it mattered not for the court's application of judicial
estoppel whether the defendant in the subsequent action was in any way
prejudiced by the earlier position taken by the plaintiff/debtor.6 °
Because the rationale behind judicial estoppel is protection of the
integrity of the court system, judicial estoppel differs from equitable and
collateral estoppel.6" Equitable estoppel applies when a debtor sues a
creditor after discharge when the claim could have been brought during
56. See Wakefield v. SWS Sec., Inc. (In re Wakefield), 293 B.R. 372, 378 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
2003).
57. Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 291 F.3d 1282, 1285 (1 lth Cir. 2002) (quoting Salomon
Smith Barney, Inc. v. Harvey, 260 F.3d 1302, 1308 (11th Cir. 2001)).
58. 179 F.3d 197 (5th Cir. 1999).
59. Id. at 210 (emphasis omitted). A Westlaw head note search for references to this aspect
of this case revealed that thirty-five cases have cited Coastal Plains positively on this point.
Interestingly, some courts disagree on this point, with two declining to extend this rationale and
two distinguishing the case.
60. Id.
61. See id.
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the bankruptcy proceeding.62 Unlike equitable estoppel, for judicial
estoppel to apply, "it is not necessary that the two proceedings in which
the inconsistent statements were made be related, or that the party
against whom the inconsistent pleading is being used be specifically
prejudiced by the inconsistency. '6 3 Judicial estoppel applies where the
defendant in the subsequent action is not a creditor in the bankruptcy,
but is an entity or person against whom the debtor may have a claim.
Nor does judicial estoppel require privity, which is generally required
for collateral estoppel, or any type of detrimental reliance or prejudice to
any party.' Instead, as long as the positions are inconsistent and "the
inconsistency would allow a party to benefit from deliberate manipula-
tion of the courts," judicial estoppel may apply.65
Because of the manner in which many courts have developed the
doctrine of judicial estoppel, it is not difficult for a defendant to show
deliberate manipulation of the court system. As one court has explained,
"many courts have found that the combination of a party's knowledge of
the claim and motive for concealment in the face of an affirmative duty
to disclose the claim provides sufficient evidence of intent to manipulate
the judicial system. 66 Indeed, some courts have been willing to infer
intent in cases in which the plaintiff knew of the claim and had a theoret-
ical motive to conceal it even if there is little to no evidence of active
concealment.67 Thus, some courts will infer intent if the debtor knew he
or she had a potential claim (regardless of whether they truly understood
that the schedule required its disclosure) and did not list it, as just about
every debtor will have a theoretical motive to conceal potential assets.
What follows is a description of cases involving various ways in
which courts have approached the judicial estoppel issue. While some
courts appear to stretch in order to apply judicial estoppel to dismiss
plaintiffs' claims, others have understood that debtors are often unso-
phisticated litigants who rely heavily on their counsel. Rather than per-
mitting a windfall to alleged discriminators, the latter group of courts
either permits the plaintiff to proceed on his or her claim or allows the
trustee to do so for the benefit of the creditors.
62. See, e.g., Brassfield v. Jack McLendon Furniture, Inc., 953 F. Supp. 1424, 1432 (M.D.
Ala. 1996).
63. Lott v. Sally Beauty Co., No. 3:OOCVI216J20TJC, 2002 WL 533651, at * 3 (M.D. Fla.
Mar. 5, 2002).
64. Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 291 F.3d 1282, 1286 (11th Cir. 2002).
65. Chandler v. Samford Univ., 35 F. Supp. 2d 861, 863 (N.D. Ala. 1999).
66. Id. at 864.
67. See, e.g., Burnes, 291 F.3d at 1287.
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A. Judicial Estoppel as a Tool to Stop Debtors' Employment
Discrimination Cases
In case after case, bankruptcy debtors have lost employment dis-
crimination claims because they failed to disclose a pending claim, or an
accrued but unfiled claim, on their schedule of bankruptcy assets. The
timing surrounding these failures to disclose varies. In some cases, the
plaintiffs have filed a charge with the EEOC either before, during, or
after discharge. In others, they have already filed a lawsuit prior to peti-
tioning for bankruptcy, although in other cases the lawsuit was filed
after discharge. Whatever the fact pattern, courts have found ways, usu-
ally using summary judgment, to dismiss employment discrimination
lawsuits due to the failure to list the claim, despite the debtor's provision
of seemingly good reasons for this failure.
Barger v. City of Cartersville, Georgia68 exemplifies the types of
arguments that plaintiffs make in an effort to avoid judicial estoppel, and
which courts routinely reject. In this case, Donna Barger was demoted
after returning to work from back surgery; consequently, she filed a dis-
crimination charge with the EEOC, received a right to sue letter, and
filed a lawsuit against her employer for reinstatement to her former posi-
tion.6 9 Barger later added claims for compensatory and punitive
damages.7°
About one month after Barger filed her employment discrimination
suit, she filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, as her demotion and lower pay
made it difficult for her to make ends meet.7' However, Barger failed to
list her pending employment discrimination claim on her schedule. 2
She later told her bankruptcy attorney and the trustee about the pending
suit, but she told the trustee that the suit merely sought reinstatement,
and neglected to mention the claims for compensatory and punitive dam-
ages. 73 Two months later, the bankruptcy court granted her a "no asset
discharge," which meant that no assets were distributed and the trustee
was relieved of all further duties.74
A little less than a month later, Barger's employer discovered that
she had failed to disclose the discrimination claim on her bankruptcy
schedule, and consequently moved for summary judgment based on
judicial estoppel.75 In response, Barger went back to the bankruptcy
68. 348 F.3d 1289 (1lth Cir. 2003).
69. Id. at 1290-91.
70. Id. at 1291.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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court and successfully reopened the bankruptcy case in an attempt to list
the claim as an asset. 76 However, the district court, unimpressed with
Barger's attempt to fix the situation, granted summary judgment in favor
of her employer, reasoning that Barger was estopped to bring suit or,
alternatively, lacked standing to sue. 7 7  Several days later, the bank-
ruptcy court ruled that her failure to list the claim was inadvertent.78
Based on the bankruptcy court's ruling, Barger moved the district court
to reconsider its grant of summary judgment for the employer, but the
district court refused to reconsider, and Barger appealed to the Eleventh
Circuit.
The Eleventh Circuit used a two prong test in evaluating the appli-
cation of judicial estoppel to Barger's case: (1) whether the inconsistent
position had been "'made under oath in a prior proceeding'"; and (2)
whether the inconsistencies were "'calculated to make a mockery of the
judicial system.'"80 Finding that the first prong was clearly met, the
court focused on the second prong and analyzed Barger's intent. Barger
argued that she had no intent to manipulate the process, as evidenced by
her telling her bankruptcy attorney and the trustee about the employment
discrimination suit, and by her reopening the bankruptcy case to list the
claim. 81 However, the court was unimpressed. First, the court explained
that even though Barger's lawyer failed to list the claim for her, Barger's
recourse was a malpractice action against her lawyer, and the court
refused to "'[visit] the sins of plaintiffs lawyer upon the defendant. 8 2
The court went a step further, noting that even if Barger's failure to
76. Id. at 1291-92.
77. Id. at 1292.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1293-94 (quoting Salomon Smith Barney, Inc. v. Harvey, 260 F.3d 1302, 1308
(1 th Cir. 2001)).
81. Id. at 1295.
82. Id. (quoting Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 634, n.10 (1962)). Link involved
dismissal of a diversity case because of long delays and plaintiff counsel's failure to attend the
pretrial conference. The case was filed in 1954, but the pretrial conference was not scheduled
until six years later in 1960, and plaintiffs counsel failed to attend it because "he was doing some
work on some papers." Link, 370 U.S. at 627. Given the delay and plaintiffs counsel's
inadequate excuse for not appearing at the pretrial conference, it is not surprising that the trial
court dismissed the lawsuit for failure to appear at the conference and failure to prosecute.
Indeed, several courts have distinguished the fact patterns they faced from the facts in Link to
avoid the harsh result of dismissal. See, e.g., U.S. v. $184,505.01 in U.S. Currency, 72 F.3d 1160,
1164 (3d Cir. 1995); Alexander v. Local 496, Laborers' Int'l Union of N. Am., 177 F.3d 394, 404
(6th Cir. 1999).
Like Barger, the plaintiff in Casey v. Peco Foods, Inc. argued that she was not intentionally
trying to manipulate the process when she failed to list her EEOC charge on her bankruptcy
schedules. 297 B.R. 73 (S.D. Miss. 2003). Relying on Coastal Plains, the court rejected her
argument, concluding that "inadvertence resulting from ignorance of bankruptcy disclosure
requirements and consequent reliance on one's bankruptcy attorney for guidance and advice 'is
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disclose was her attorney's fault, the nondisclosure could, nevertheless,
not be characterized as inadvertent.83 Under Coastal Plains, a party's
failure to disclose could only be characterized as inadvertent if she either
lacked knowledge of the claim or had no motive to conceal it.84 Apply-
ing the Coastal Plains standard, the Barger court concluded that Barger
failed to meet either requirement. Barger obviously knew about the
claim, having filed it and told her bankruptcy attorney and the trustee
about it. Further, the court reasoned that she benefited from the omis-
sion as "she could keep any proceeds for herself and not have them
become part of the bankruptcy estate."85 Thus, there was "sufficient evi-
dence from which to infer her intentional manipulation."86
The court found Barger's discussion with the trustee regarding the
lawsuit particularly indicative of intentional manipulation.87 Signifi-
cantly, when asked for the monetary value of the lawsuit, Barger only
mentioned that she was seeking reinstatement and failed to disclose her
recent amendment requesting backpay and damages.88 Whereas the
bankruptcy court concluded that it was the trustee's responsibility to
investigate any claims, the court here concluded that the "foremost
responsibility in this matter was for Barger to fully disclose her
assets."8 9 As such, the court did not fault the trustee in accepting
Barger's representations about the lawsuit. 90
The court was likewise unimpressed with Barger's attempt to reo-
pen the bankruptcy estate to list her discrimination claim on the sched-
ule. Because she moved to reopen the estate only after the defendant's
motion for summary judgment, the court reasoned that "'[a]llowing [a
debtor] to back up, re-open the bankruptcy case, and amend his bank-
ruptcy filings, only after his omission has been challenged by an adver-
sary, suggests that the debtor should consider disclosing potential assets
only if he is caught concealing them." '9 According to the court, such a
standard would lessen the incentive for debtors to submit honest disclo-
sures. 92 Therefore, the court found that "Barger's disclosure upon re-
not the type that precludes judicial estoppel against plaintiff ... ". ' Id. (quoting Browning Mfg. v.
Mims (In re Coastal Plains, Inc.), 179 F.3d 197, 212 (5th Cir. 1999)).
83. Barger, 348 F.3d at 1295.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1297.
92. Id.
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opening the bankruptcy estate deserves no favor."93
Notwithstanding the court's dismissal of her claims for monetary
damages, the court was more receptive to Barger's request for reinstate-
ment. The court explained that, in contrast to monetary damages,
injunctive relief adds no monetary value to the bankruptcy estate. 94
Accordingly, Barger's claim for reinstatement, even if she had disclosed
it, would have brought no money to her bankruptcy estate.95 As such,
the court concluded that judicial estoppel did not prevent her from pur-
suing this part of her claim. 96
Other plaintiffs have likewise fared poorly, even with claims that
do not involve monetary damages. In Schertz-Nelson v. AT&T Corp.,97
for example, an Arizona district court refused to permit the plaintiff to
pursue reinstatement in her employment discrimination case.98 Specifi-
cally, the court distinguished between equitable relief that would not
bring monetary value, such as stopping the defendant from engaging in
illegal practices, and equitable relief that would bring monetary value,
such as reinstatement to a more lucrative position. 99 Because reinstate-
ment might have had an affect on her bankruptcy case, the court invoked
judicial estoppel to block Schertz-Nelson from pursuing her employment
discrimination case. 1°°
Like Barger, Schertz-Nelson moved to reopen her bankruptcy case
once she realized her omission of the claim against her employer. 101
Unlike Barger however, Schertz-Nelson claimed that she failed to dis-
close the potential claim at the time she filed for bankruptcy because she
thought it was time-barred. 02 Schertz-Nelson had filed a charge of dis-
crimination with the EEOC and the Arizona Civil Rights Division
("ACRD") against her employer in May 1997.103 One month later, she
received a letter from the ACRD indicating that she had ninety days
during which to file a lawsuit under the Arizona Civil Rights Act
("ACRA"), but no later than one year from the date of her EEOC
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. Interestingly, this essentially places plaintiffs back in the position they occupied prior
to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which finally provided compensatory and punitive damages for
victims of employment discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. §1981a (2000). Indeed, in this context it is
unclear how the courts should conceptualize employment discrimination relief that has
traditionally been considered equitable (e.g., backpay, which is in the form of a monetary award).
97. No. CIV 99-555-PHX-SMM, 2003 WL 22047646 (D. Ariz. July 8, 2003).
98. Id. at *6.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See id. at *5.
102. Id. at *6.
103. Id. at *1.
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charge." Almost one year later, in May 1998, she filed for bankruptcy
under Chapter 7, without having pursued her ACRA claim. °5 While
Schertz-Nelson received a discharge from the bankruptcy court in
August 1998, she did not receive a notice of right to sue from the EEOC
until December 1998.106 Thus, one could see why she might have
thought her claim was time-barred. The court, however, was not per-
suaded, and found her contention "disingenuous."' 07 Specifically, the
court noted that even assuming Schertz-Nelson believed that the ACRD
instructions applied to her EEOC claim, the one-year limitations period
had not yet expired at the time she filed for bankruptcy. 10 8 Also,
because she did not pursue a lawsuit under the ACRA, the ACRD
instructions did not apply to her." 9 Finally, Schertz-Nelson's failure to
clarify her status with counsel, the EEOC, or the ACRD, despite access
to all three, further evidenced the falsity of her timing representations. 110
Other debtors have argued that cases arising under Chapter 13
should be treated differently than cases arising under Chapter 7, as the
plaintiff argued in De Leon v. Comcar Industries, Inc. " ' The plaintiff in
that case had filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 13, but had failed to
disclose an employment discrimination suit. 1 12 In an attempt to avoid
application of judicial estoppel to bar his claim, De Leon maintained that
Chapter 13 was different than Chapter 7 because debts are completely
discharged under Chapter 7, whereas debts are discounted and ultimately
repaid under a Chapter 13 filing. 3 The court was not persuaded, con-
cluding that a financial motive not to disclose such claims exists in both
Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 cases, because in Chapter 13 cases, the claims
could affect the amount of the discount and repayment.1 4 In other
words, money from the employment discrimination case might be fac-
tored in as a source of funds to repay outstanding debts as well as the
amount by which those debts would be discounted. As such, the court
found no reason for distinguishing between Chapter 7 and Chapter 13
cases, noting "the need for complete and honest disclosure" regardless
of the type of bankruptcy proceeding." 5
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at *1-2.
107. Id. at *6.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. 321 F.3d 1289, 1291 (11th Cir. 2003).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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On the other hand, at least one court has distinguished Chapter 7
debtors from Chapter 13 debtors. In Chandler v. Samford University,"6
for example, the court concluded that Chapter 7 debtors have no duty to
disclose property acquired after the filing of the bankruptcy case."1 7 In
contrast, Chapter 13 debtors have a continuing obligation to disclose
assets acquired during the pendency of the bankruptcy case.1 1 8 There-
fore, in the context of employment discrimination claims arising during
the pendency of a bankruptcy case, a Chapter 7 debtor retains possession
of the claim, whereas a Chapter 13 debtor is obligated to disclose this
after-acquired property. 1 9
The Chapter 7 cases described herein do not discuss the time at
which the plaintiffs employment discrimination claim arises, instead
assuming that the claim arose prior to the bankruptcy petition. How-
ever, for the purpose of determining whether the plaintiff must disclose
the claim, it may not be obvious when the claim arises. Does it arise at
the time of the wrongdoing complained of, or when the plaintiff receives
her right to sue letter and therefore can legally pursue her action?
Regardless of when the claim arises and when the duty to disclose
attaches, exercising the continuing duty to disclose has not saved Chap-
ter 13 debtors from judicial estoppel. While the cases described above
involved situations in which the plaintiff/debtor had already been dis-
charged in bankruptcy, other courts have held that even if discharge has
not yet occurred, the debtor cannot avoid judicial estoppel by correcting
his schedule to include the discrimination claim. In Walker v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc., 2 ' for example, the plaintiff, a Chapter 13 debtor, failed to
disclose his pending race discrimination case against his employer. 2'
After the employer moved for summary judgment based on judicial
estoppel, Walker amended his then-pending bankruptcy schedule to
include the lawsuit as one of his assets.'2 2 Even though Walker
amended the schedule prior to discharge of his bankruptcy claim, the
court, in essence, concluded that he had waited too long to do so. 1 23
Indeed, Walker had not sought to amend the schedule to include the
116. 35 F. Supp. 2d 861 (N.D. Ala. 1999).
117. Id. at 864 n.3.
118. Id. This argument did not save the debtor in this case from the effects of judicial estoppel.
The debtor had converted her Chapter 13 case to a Chapter 7, but had not done so until a month
after she filed her EEOC charge. Thus, she knew of the charge during the pendency of her
Chapter 13 case, and had a duty to disclose during that one month period, even though the cause
of action arguably arose post-petition. Id. at 864-65.
119. Id. at 864 n.3.
120. No. Civ.A. 100CV0558-TWT, 2002 WL 32136202 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 1, 2002)
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See id. at *4.
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discrimination claim until the employer moved for summary judg-
ment. 124 It was of no great moment to the court that there was no evi-
dence that the bankruptcy court relied on the purported
misrepresentation. 125 Reasoning that assets acquired after filing for
bankruptcy could affect the Chapter 13 payment plan, the court estopped
Walker from pursuing either damages or reinstatement.12 6
B. Debtors Who Avoid Judicial Estoppel
Not all courts addressing judicial estoppel in the context of bank-
ruptcy have reacted with such skepticism to debtors' motives for failing
to list an employment discrimination claim or charge on his or her bank-
ruptcy schedule. For instance, some courts have refused to estop a
debtor because the failure to disclose was due to mistake or inadver-
tence. Other courts have permitted the trustees to pursue the discrimina-
tion claim, reasoning that while judicial estoppel may stop the debtor
from pursuing his or her claim, the doctrine should not stop the trustee
from pursuing assets of the estate. Still others have distinguished
between the types of bankruptcy cases, allowing Chapter 13 debtors to
pursue their claims post-confirmation.
In addition, some debtors have benefited from a more plaintiff-
friendly standard for judicial estoppel. Specifically, in determining
whether to apply the doctrine of judicial estoppel, the Seventh Circuit in
Cannon-Stokes v. Potter 27 considered whether "'the party seeking to
assert an inconsistent position would derive an unfair advantage or
impose an unfair detriment on the opposing party if not estopped.' 1,,28
The Cannon-Stokes court applied this standard in determining whether
the plaintiff should be barred from pursuing her employment discrimina-
tion claim, which she failed to disclose in her bankruptcy schedules.
While noting that many of the elements for judicial estoppel were pre-
sent, the court found it "difficult to see how Cannon-Stokes ha[d]
received an unfair advantage from her inconsistent positions."' 29
Responding to the employer's claim that had the bankruptcy court
known of the plaintiff's claim, it would not have entered a no-asset find-
ing and would not have discharged Cannon-Stokes' debts, the court
pointed out that "[t]his assertion was not substantiated with an affidavit
from the bankruptcy trustee and, in reality, the trustee might rather have
abandoned this contingent claim on the basis that it was 'of inconse-
124. Id.
125. Id. at *5.
126. Id. at *5-6.
127. No. 03C1942, 2004 WL 407014 (N.D. II1. Mar. 4, 2004).
128. Id. at *2 (quoting United States v. Christian, 342 F.3d 744, 747 (7th Cir. 2003)).
129. Id. at *3.
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quential value and benefit to the estate.' , 30
Additionally, the court determined that Cannon-Stokes' actions
lacked the requisite intent or bad faith which would justify application of
judicial estoppel.' 3 ' The court explained that judicial estoppel should
only be applied to serve the interest of justice, and here, the application
of the doctrine would not advance that interest. 32 In reaching this con-
clusion, the court was persuaded by Cannon-Stokes' asking her bank-
*ruptcy attorney about including the claim and his telling her that she did
not have to list it while it was being investigated. 33 Moreover, as her
employment discrimination case was pending in the same courthouse as
her bankruptcy action, "for Cannon-Stokes to have thought that she
could hide this asset would have been naive in the extreme."'' 34
"[U]nable to find the intentional misconduct that would invoke a penalty
foreclosing her claims," the court denied the employer's motion to dis-
miss, allowing Cannon-Stokes to proceed with her discrimination
claim. 135
Courts also have been more understanding towards pro se debtors,
those justifiably relying on the legal advice of counsel, and those other-
wise lacking legal sophistication. In Fairchild v. Touchtunes Music
Corp., 3 6 for example, the court refused to invoke judicial estoppel
against the plaintiff for failing to disclose a sex discrimination claim on
his pro se Chapter 7 petition. 3 7 Concluding that there was insufficient
evidence that Fairchild acted in bad faith in failing to include the sex
discrimination claim, the court stated: "We do not assume that a pro se
bankruptcy petitioner would know that Question 4A was designed to
elicit information about a lawsuit or claim that the petitioner may have
as an asset."'' 38 Question 4A was "captioned 'Suits And Administrative
Proceedings, Execution, Garnishments And Attachments' and ask[ed]
for 'all suits and administrative proceedings to which the debtor is or
was a party within one year immediately preceding bankruptcy
case.' """ The court explained that this question appeared "in the midst
of questions focused on payments to creditors and attached or repos-
sessed property of the debtor."' 4 ° As such, the court determined that it
130. Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 554 (2000)).
131. Id. at *4-5.
132. Id.
133. Id. at *4.
134. Id.
135. Id. at *5.
136. No. 01-C9699, 2002 WL 31833768 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 12, 2002).
137. Id. at *2.
138. Id. (footnote omitted).
139. Id.
140. Id.
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was unclear to a pro se litigant that disclosure of all lawsuits and admin-
istrative proceedings was required.14'
A similar conclusion was reached in Pealo v. AAF McQuay, Inc.'42
In Pealo, the court noted that the plaintiff had revealed the sex discrimi-
nation claim to bankruptcy counsel and had relied on counsel's advice in
not listing it on the bankruptcy schedule. 4 3 Furthermore, once the
plaintiff learned of his error, he successfully attempted to reopen the
bankruptcy proceeding."' 4 Based on these facts, the court concluded
that the failure to schedule his sex discrimination case was unintentional
and, therefore, not barred by estoppel. 145
Finally, debtors have avoided judicial estoppel where the trustee
intervenes as the real party in interest. In Parker v. Wendy's Interna-
tional, Inc.,'46 the plaintiff failed to disclose on her Chapter 7 schedule
her pending employment discrimination suit. 14 7 The bankruptcy court
granted a no-asset discharge for Parker. 148  When the trustee subse-
quently discovered Parker's failure to disclose the employment discrimi-
nation case, the trustee moved to reopen the bankruptcy case and to
intervene in the employment discrimination suit.149 Both of the trustee's
motions were granted. 150 The employer then filed a motion to dismiss
the employment discrimination case, alleging that Parker's claims were
barred by judicial estoppel.' 5 ' The district court granted the employer's
motion to dismiss, ruling that both Parker and the trustee were judicially
estopped from pursuing Parker's employment discrimination case.' 52
However, the Eleventh Circuit reversed, 53 explaining that because
141. Id. at *3.
142. 140 F. Supp. 2d 233 (N.D.N.Y. 2001).
143. Id. at 237.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. 365 F.3d 1268 (11 th Cir. 2004).
147. Id. at 1269.
148. Id. at 1270.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1270-71.
153. The Eleventh Circuit actually issued two opinions, one on March 31, 2004 and the second
on April 15, 2004. The April 15th opinion vacated and replaced the March 31st decision. Both
opinions ultimately reversed the district court and held in favor of the trustee. However, it is
interesting to note that the March 31 st opinion contains perhaps the most aggressive statement of
bankruptcy-based judicial estoppel to date. In its March 31st opinion, the Eleventh Circuit
reasoned that had the plaintiff intentionally tried to deprive the bankruptcy estate of a valuable
asset, the trustee would have suffered the penalty of being precluded from realizing the value of
the asset, thus preserving the harm the debtor would have intended. However, the Eleventh
Circuit, finding that the plaintiff's omission was inadvertent, refused to apply judicial estoppel to
either the plaintiff or the trustee. Parker v. Wendy's Int'l, Inc., No. 02-16185, at 8-10 (11 th Cir.
Mar. 31, 2004), available at http://www.ca 11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200216185.pdf.
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Parker failed to list the employment discrimination claim on her sched-
ules, the claim became an asset of the bankruptcy estate, and the trustee
therefore had standing to pursue the claim as the real party in interest. 154
The court held that the trustee could not be judicially estopped to pursue
the claim, as the trustee "never abandoned [the plaintiffs] discrimina-
tion claim" and "never took an inconsistent position under oath with
regard to this claim." '5 The court therefore refused to taint or burden
the trustee with Parker's misconduct. 156 Moreover, the court reasoned,
in the unlikely event that the trustee recovered more money damages
than was owed to creditors, judicial estoppel might prevent Parker from
personally collecting any of the remaining proceeds of the judgment.157
Likewise, in Taylor v. Comcast Cablevision of Arkansas, Inc.,'58
the court allowed the plaintiffs undisclosed disability discrimination
suit to proceed due, in part, to the trustee's intervention. 159  After the
employer filed its motion for summary judgment based on judicial
estoppel, Taylor successfully moved to reopen his bankruptcy case. 16 0
At the same time, the trustee successfully filed a motion to intervene in
the action.161 In denying the employer's motion for summary judgment,
the court explained that, "'the best interest of creditors should be a para-
mount consideration before dismissing the cause of action under the
doctrine of judicial estoppel [and t]he trustee should be substituted as the
real-party-in-interest to protect the assets of the estate.' "162 The court
further noted than "[a]n overly strict application of judicial estoppel has
been criticized as providing a windfall to the alleged wrongdoer and
154. Parker, 365 F.3d at 1272.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1273.
157. Id. at 1273 n.4. Thus, the court acknowledged a well-established rule: The trustee in
bankruptcy stands not only in the shoes of the debtor but also in the shoes of the debtor's
creditors. When exercising the avoidance power as a representative of the estate, the trustee is
vested with the rights of creditors and is not limited to the rights of the debtor. Id. Accordingly,
even if the creditor, whose interest the trustee seeks to avoid, has a valid defense against the
debtor, it does not follow that an action taken by the trustee acting as a representative of the
debtor's creditors must similarly fail. Id. When a trustee seeks "to enhance the value of estate
property, the party seeking to prevent avoidance of its interest may not raise any misconduct or
malfeasance by the debtor as a defense," because "'[tihe trustee, in his capacity as trustee, is not
estopped by the debtor's misconduct."' Cook v. United States (In re Earl Roggenbuck Farms,
Inc.), 51 B.R. 913, 917 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985); see also Buffalo Metro. Fed. Credit Union v.
Mogavero (In re Cooley), No. 00-CV-0345E(M), 2001 WL 135822, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. 2001);
CEPA Consulting, Ltd. v. King Main Hurdman (In re Wedtech Sec. Litig.), 138 B.R. 5, 8 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1992).
158. 252 F. Supp. 2d 793 (E.D. Ark. 2003).
159. Id. at 795.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 799 (quoting Thomas E. Ray, Judicial Estoppel in Chapters 7 and 13, 21 AM.
BANrKR. INST. J. 14, 21 (2002)).
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possibly depriving creditors, who are not parties to the nonbankruptcy
action, of a potential bankruptcy asset."' 63 Based on the facts presented,
Taylor was able to proceed with his employment discrimination
claim. 164
Occasionally, a court has distinguished between Chapter 13 debtors
and Chapter 7 debtors with respect to whether a trustee may pursue a
debtor's claim as the real party in interest. In Murray v. Board of Edu-
cation of New York, 16 a case involving a Chapter 13 debtor, the court
explained that Chapter 7 debtors lose standing to pursue civil suits, and
therefore their trustees must bring their suits. 16 6 On the other hand,
Chapter 13 debtors like Murray are not subject to this restriction and
instead retain standing in any pending civil suits. 167 After rejecting the
defendant's standing argument, the court addressed its argument for
judicial estoppel, concluding that there was no evidence of bad faith or
intent to mislead, and that even if Murray's failure to schedule the claim
had been intentional, the nondisclosure had nevertheless been cured by
the trustee's reopening of her bankruptcy. 168 The court noted that the
rationale for estopping her-that she would profit at the expense of her
creditors-no longer applied, as her creditors would be entitled to any
monetary recovery from the discrimination suit.
16 9
C. Reopening Bankruptcies and Judicial Estoppel
In several of the cases discussed above, the debtor argued that judi-
cial estoppel should not apply because he or she had moved, or would
move, to reopen the bankruptcy and amend his or her schedule to
include the undisclosed lawsuit. A debtor's attempts or success in
reopening a bankruptcy case has a variable influence on the courts'
determinations of whether judicial estoppel should apply. On one hand,
some courts essentially consider the debtor's attempts to reopen the
bankruptcy case irrelevant or even indicative of the debtor's malfea-
sance. On the other hand, other courts have looked favorably on the
debtor's attempts, considering them evidence of the debtor's inadver-
tence or mistake. Still other courts have found a debtor's efforts to reo-
pen determinative. Courts subscribing to this latter approach maintain
163. Id. at 798.
164. Id. at 799.
165. 248 B.R 484 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
166. Id. at 486.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 487.
169. Id.; see also Richardson v. United Parcel Serv., 195 B.R. 737, 739 (E.D. Mo. 1996)
(refusing to apply judicial estoppel in the context of still pending Chapter 13 petition, reasoning
that "creditors would be penalized if the court were to dismiss the claim on the ground of judicial
estoppel").
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that if the bankruptcy case were reopened and the lawsuit scheduled,
judicial estoppel could no longer be applied because there no longer
would be an inconsistent statement upon which to base its operation.
This rationale is illustrated by In re Rochester.7 ° In Rochester, the
bankruptcy court granted the debtor's motion to reopen his Chapter 7
case to schedule his products liability claim, which he previously failed
to disclose. 7' Unlike many of the federal district courts in the employ-
ment discrimination cases described above, the bankruptcy court here
was concerned for the creditors and assets that might be available to
satisfy some of the debtor's unpaid debt of $120,000.172 With this in
mind, the court reasoned: "'Reopening may be detrimental to [the
defendant] by depriving it of a judicial estoppel argument[,] but this
court cannot countenance depriving Debtor's creditors of the opportu-
nity to share in damages to which Debtor is entitled in order to preserve
[the defendant's] judicial estoppel argument.' '' 173  The court further
explained, "it is counterintuitive that a debtor's previous failure to dis-
close an asset should bar the bankruptcy court from reopening the case
or prevent a trustee from administering property of the estate for the
benefit of the innocent creditors."'' 74  Finally, the bankruptcy court
explained that because it allowed the Chapter 7 case to be reopened, the
state court in which Rochester's products liability claim was pending
should not invoke judicial estoppel to dismiss the products liability
claim. 17 5
In In re Haskett,176 another bankruptcy case involving a motion to
reopen, the court noted that it was a rather new phenomenon for district
and appellate courts to apply judicial estoppel despite the debtor's
reopening of the bankruptcy case. 177 Canvassing former cases, the court
explained that "[b]efore Burnes and De Leon, even the [Eleventh] Cir-
cuit agreed that reopening to schedule a previously undisclosed asset
may be justified if in the best interests of the estate and creditors and
regardless of the reasons for the nondisclosure."' 178 "Whereas tradition
170. 308 B.R. 596 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2004).
171. Id. at 599, 613.
172. Id. at 601-02.
173. Id. (quoting In re Daniel, 205 B.R. 346, 349 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1997)).
174. Id. at 602. The court in In re Upshur advanced a similar rationale in reopening a
bankruptcy case to allow the trustee to administer a previously undisclosed employment
discrimination claim. 317 B.R. 446 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2004). As in Rochester, the court's
emphasis in Upshur was on the creditors, noting that "when the purpose of the motion to reopen is
to add an undisclosed asset, the most important consideration is the benefit to the creditors." Id. at
450.
175. In re Rochester, 308 B.R. at 612.
176. 297 B.R. 637 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2003).
177. Id. at 641-43.
178. Id. at 641.
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seemed to inure an innocent-until-proven-guilty approach by allowing
reopen and amendment unless proof of bad faith, Burnes seemed to
rather nonchalantly turn the rule topsy-turvy," resulting in what amounts
to an assumption of guilt on the part of the debtor unless proven inno-
cent."7 9 Granting the debtor's motion to reopen her bankruptcy case to
account for the undisclosed discrimination claim, the court concluded
that "[t]hough her failure to schedule the asset did certainly have an
effect on the administration of the estate, the real harm would be in not
allowing her creditors to benefit now."1 80
As the cases discussed demonstrate, not all courts consider the
potential harm to creditors in deciding whether or not to apply judicial
estoppel to unscheduled claims of debtors. Indeed, while creditors are
central to such a determination in cases such as In re Rochester and In re
Haskett, other courts have adopted a different approach, either giving
less weight to or not factoring creditors into their assessment at all.
D. Other Related Arguments Used to Bar Debtors' Employment
Discrimination Claims
Defendants in employment discrimination suits have used two
other arguments in an effort to have a plaintiff/debtor's case dismissed.
First, defendants have argued that a plaintiff lacks standing to pursue the
claim, as the trustee in a Chapter 7 case is the only person who can
pursue assets of the estate. Second, defendants have argued that the
debtor cannot pursue the claim because the trustee is the real party in
interest under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a). Defendants appear
to make the real party in interest argument less frequently, perhaps
because doing so may lead to another lawsuit or the pursuit of the same
lawsuit by the trustee.
Harvey v. Southern Minnesota Beet Sugar Cooperative"' illus-
trates a situation in which the employer successfully used the standing
argument to bar the plaintiffs employment discrimination suit. 182 This
case involved a former Chapter 7 debtor who brought a sexual harass-
ment case under Title VII. 183 The court granted the employer's motion
for summary judgment, explaining that "'the property of the bankruptcy
estate includes all causes of action that the debtor could have brought at
the time of the bankruptcy petition." 84 Such an asset becomes the
179. Id. at 642.
180. Id. at 644.
181. No. Civ. 02-4934, 2004 WL 368471 (D. Minn. Feb. 26, 2004).
182. Id. at *2.
183. Id. at *1.
184. Id. at *2 (quoting United States ex rel. Gebert v. Transp. Admin. Servs., 260 F.3d 909,
913 (8th Cir. 2001)) (emphasis added).
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property of the bankruptcy estate, and the trustee, not the debtor, has
standing to pursue the claim. 85 Applying these principles to the case at
bar, the court determined that the plaintiffs claims accrued prior to her
filing the bankruptcy petition, at the time she was allegedly harassed.' 86
Upon filing, the claim became property of the bankruptcy estate, depriv-
ing the plaintiff of standing with respect to the claim.' 87
Harvey demonstrates that the time at which the discrimination
claim accrues is central to a standing determination. In Anderson v.
Acme Markets, Inc.,88 the employment discrimination plaintiff, also a
Chapter 7 debtor, attempted to use accrual to thwart the employer's
argument that he lacked standing.' 89 Specifically, Anderson argued that
his cause of action did not accrue until after the bankruptcy discharge
because he did not receive his right to sue letter until three months after
the discharge. 9° The court was unimpressed, reasoning that the cause
of action accrued on Anderson's last day of work, which occurred prior
to his discharge. 9' Because Anderson never scheduled the potential
claim, it was still part of the bankruptcy estate, and "only the Trustee in
Bankruptcy, as the sole representative of the estate, has standing to pur-
sue the claims."'192 As Anderson lacked standing to bring the employ-
ment discrimination claim, the court dismissed the case. 193
While both these cases arose under Chapter 7, courts are split as to
whether a Chapter 13 debtor's failure to schedule an accrued employ-
ment discrimination claim deprives him or her of standing to pursue the
claim in his or her own right. A number of courts have held that Chapter
13 debtors are indistinguishable from Chapter 7 debtors in this respect,
as both lose standing to pursue an undisclosed claim.' 94 In contrast,
some courts have treated Chapter 13 debtors differently, explaining that
Chapter 13 debtors do not lose standing to pursue their claims in their
own right, because they remain in possession of the property of the
estate.' 95 Finally, other courts have maintained that Chapter 13 debtors
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. 287 B.R. 624 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
189. Id.
190. Id. at 629.
191. Id. at 631.
192. Id.
193. Id.; see also Byrd v. Potter, 306 B.R. 559, 562-63 (N.D. Miss. 2002) (dismissing
employment discrimination suit for lack of standing, as plaintiff/debtor's causes of actions accrued
prior to filing of bankruptcy and, as such, became property of the bankruptcy estate).
194. See, e.g., Richardson v. United Parcel Servs., 195 B.R. 737, 739 (E.D. Mo. 1996); Taylor
v. Comcast Cablevision of Ark., Inc., 252 F. Supp. 2d 793, 795 (E.D. Ark. 2003).
195. See, e.g., Murray v. Bd. of Educ. of N.Y., 248 B.R. 484, 486 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
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retain concurrent authority to pursue claims with the trustee. 9 6
IV. WRONG AS A MATrER OF BANKRUPTCY LAW
Captain Barbossa: First, your return to shore
was not part of our negotiations nor our agree-
ment, so I must do nothin'. And secondly, you
must be a pirate for the Pirates' Code to apply,
and you're not. And thirdly, the Code is more
what you'd call "guidelines" than actual rules.
Welcome aboard the Black Pearl, Miss
Turner. ' 97
Captain Barbossa: For too long I've been
parched with thirst and unable to quench it.
Too long I've been starving to death and
haven't died. I feel nothing. Not the wind on
my face nor the spray of the sea, nor the
warmth of a woman's flesh. You best start
believing in ghost stories Miss Turner. You're
in one. 98
A. The Curse and the Gold
Central to the plot of Pirates of the Caribbean: The Curse of the
Black Pearl is the curse. The Black Pearl is "crewed by the damned," or
more accurately, by the accursed. 99 According to Captain Barbossa,
there were 882 identical pieces of Aztec gold delivered in a stone chest
to Cortez as "[b]lood money paid to stem the slaughter he wreaked upon
them with his armies. But the greed of Cortez was insatiable. So the
heathen gods placed upon the gold a terrible curse. Any mortal that
removes but a piece from that stone chest shall be punished for eter-
nity." 2" The gold rested at the Isla de Muerta, an island that could be
found only by those who already know where it is. 201 Captain Jack
Sparrow somehow discovered the location of the island and proceeded
with the Black Pearl and its pirate crew toward the island.2 °2 His first
mate, Barbossa, suggested that if the crew shared everything equally,
196. See, e.g., The Travelers Indem. Co. of Ill., Inc. v. Griner (In re Griner), 240 B.R. 432, 435
(Bankr. S.D. Ala. 1999) (noting split and holding that Chapter 13 debtor and trustee have
concurrent authority to pursue claims).
197. PiRATEs, supra note 1.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
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they should share the location of the gold.2 °3 Jack disclosed the location
of the gold, whereupon Barbossa committed mutiny and marooned Jack
on an island. 2' 4 Barbossa and his crew took the gold and incurred the
curse. 20 5 They then spent the gold all over the Caribbean.2"6
As a result of the curse, the pirates were neither living nor dead.20 7
Not being alive, they could not enjoy the fruits the gold bought them.208
Not being dead, they could not be killed.2°  They could not become
either alive or dead until the curse was lifted, which required that all of
the gold be recovered and "the blood repaid. 210
A bankruptcy estate with an unadministered asset is somewhat like
the unfortunate pirates. Although the estate has been closed, it is not
dead. And although the estate continues to exist, it is not alive. And it
cannot be either dead or alive until the unadministered asset is
recovered.
Under § 541(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, the commencement of a
case creates an estate that consists of all the debtor's legal and equitable
interests in property.21' Under the generally accepted theory of the crea-
tion of the bankruptcy estate, the trustee succeeds to the debtor's rights,
whatever they may be, as of the petition date.212 Under this view, which
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2000). This article assumes that a chose-in-action is property,
therefore becoming part of the estate. See also Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to
Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 750-51 (1998) ("These interests, which legally are sometimes
called choses in action, are obviously regarded as property."). The 1936 Restatement of Property
used the term "property" as follows: "to denote legal relations between persons with respect to a
thing. The thing may be an object having physical existence or it may be any kind of an
intangible such as a patent right or a chose in action." RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. ch. 1
introductory note (1936).
212. Professor David Gray Carlson has referred to this view as the "orthodox" theory, and
suggests an alternate theory. See David Gray Carlson, Bankruptcy's Organizing Principle, 26
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 549 (1999). Carlson's alternative theory is that § 541(a)(1) is a mere
epiphenomenon of the trustee's rights and powers under section 544(a). Id. at 573. Professor
Carlson's theory has considerable merit but he acknowledges that it has limitations in including
certain property within the estate. Id. at 616-17.
Choses-in-action for personal harms could arguably fall outside the estate based on state law
limitations on creditors' remedies. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-9-40(2) (1987); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-
13-57 (1993 & Supp. 2005); Phillips & Jacobs, Inc. v. Color-Art, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 14, 16 (N.D.
Ga. 1982); In re Head, 204 B.R. 1022, 1025 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1997); Jankowski v. Dixie Power
Sys. (In re Rose Marine, Inc.), 203 B.R. 511, 514 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1996); Kilgore v. Buice, 192
S.E.2d 256, 258 (Ga. 1972); Mickler v. Aaron, 490 So. 2d 1343, 1344 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
But see, e.g., Arbie Mineral Feed Co. v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 462 N.W.2d 677, 680 (Iowa
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is virtually uniformly accepted by bankruptcy courts213 and commenta-
tors,214 it is "axiomatic" that a pre-petition claim or cause of action is
property of the estate.21 5
B. What Should Be Done about Dishonesty? Judicial Estoppel:
Wrong on Its Own Terms
Another fundamental theme in bankruptcy law is honesty. Bank-
ruptcy, it is said, is for the "honest but unfortunate. 216 Bankruptcy
1990) (explaining that Iowa "has adopted the broad form of statutory execution authorizing levy
on choses in action").
And under the law of some states, even an execution creditor, whose writ has been returned
unsatisfied, may not be able to reach the chose-in-action that is not reduced to judgment. See, e.g.,
Washington v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 459 So. 2d 1148, 1149 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984);
Mickler, 490 So. 2d at 1344; Chaachou v. Kulhanjian, 104 So. 2d 23, 25 (Fla. 1958); Cobb v.
Walker, 198 So. 2d 324, 326 (Fla. 1940).
Because the heterodox theory raises problems that are beyond the scope of this paper, we
assume the correctness of the orthodox theory.
213. See, e.g., Looney v. Hyundai Motor Mfg. Ala. LLC, 330 F. Supp. 2d 1289 (M.D. Ala.
2004); Dionne v. Colvin (In re Moore), 312 B.R. 902 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2004); James v.
Trustmark Nat. Bank, 298 B.R. 270 (N.D. Miss. 2003); In re Lopez, 283 B.R. 22 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
2002); Anderson v. Acme Mkts., Inc., 287 B.R. 624 (E.D. Pa. 2002); Bd. of Trs. of Teamsters
Local 863 Pension Fund v. Foodtown, Inc., 296 F.3d 164, 169 n.5 (3d Cir. 2002); Stevenson v.
J.C. Bradford & Co. (In re Cannon), 277 F.3d 838, 853-54 (6th Cir. 2002); In re Key, 255 B.R.
217 (Bankr. D. Neb. 2000); In re Zaleha, 162 B.R. 309 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1993); Sender v. Simon,
84 F.3d 1299, 1304-05 (10th Cir. 1996); Wischan v. Adler (In re Wischan), 77 F.3d 875, 877 (5th
Cir. 1996); The Gainesville Venture, Ltd. v. C & R Trust (In re Gainesville Venture, Ltd.), 159
B.R. 810 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1993); Mar. Elec. Co. v. United Jersey Bank, 959 F.2d 1194 (3d Cir.
1991); In re Smith, 640 F.2d 888 (7th Cir. 1981).
214. See COLLIER ON BArNRnuircy 15TH (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 15th ed.
2005) (1979). For the remainder of this article, it is assumed that a debtor's pre-petition
employment discrimination action is property of the estate under the orthodox theory. If there is
an applicable exemption the debtor may claim it. See Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638
(1992). Such an exemption might arise under federal or state law. In states that have not "opted-
out" of the federal exemption scheme, § 522(d)(I 1)(E) would exempt "front pay" awards "to the
extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any dependent of the debtor." In
"opt-out" states, exemptions must be provided by state law. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1). Some states
have exemptions that may cover the proceeds of discrimination actions. See, e.g., King v. Webb
(In re Webb), 214 B.R. 553 (E.D. Va. 1997). Other states may lack specific exemptions but
consider the property to be beyond the reach of creditors. See COLLIER, supra, 522.10[4]. An
analysis of exemptions is beyond the scope of this paper. If there is no timely objection or the
court overrules such an objection, the claim is exempt. Taylor, 503 U.S. at 641-42. For purposes
of this article, it is assumed there are no applicable exemptions.
215. Chapman, supra note 9, at 1215.
216. See, e.g., Margaret Howard, A Theory of Discharge in Bankruptcy, 48 OHIo ST. L.J. 1047,
1049 (1987) ("A second goal of bankruptcy is to reward only the honest debtor with a fresh start.
Policymakers have long been concerned that bankruptcy not be a haven for the dishonest.");
Richard E. Coulson, Consumer Abuse of Bankruptcy: An Evolving Philosophy of Debtor
Qualification for Bankruptcy Discharge, 62 ALB. L. REv. 467, 516-18 (1998) (on the provenance
of "honest but unfortunate"); Karen Gross, The Debtor as Modern Day Peon: A Problem of
Unconstitutional Conditions, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 165, 193 n.194 (1990).
It is important to distinguish between pre-bankruptcy honesty (honesty in incurring debts and
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courts maintain, with some frequency, that "the veracity of the debtor's
statements is essential to the successful administration of the Bankruptcy
Act";217 "[full and comprehensive disclosure is critical to the integrity
of the bankruptcy process";28 "veracity of the debtor's [s]tatement is
absolutely essential to the successful administration of the Bankruptcy
Code";219 and "[t]he proper 'operation of the bankruptcy system
depends on honest reporting.' ",220 Similar statements abound, and are
often made in judicial estoppel cases. As honesty is a recurrent theme,
the judicial estoppel cases address the following important question:
What should be done when a debtor is dishonest about the assets of the
estate?
There are two reasons why it is incorrect to use judicial estoppel to
deal with a debtor's dishonest act of omitting a civil action. First,
assuming that the proper use of judicial estoppel requires a court to have
accepted the party's earlier position,2 2 ' the common argument that the
bankruptcy court's order of a no-asset discharge constitutes such accept-
ance is quite simply wrong. Second, the entry of discharge has nothing
to do with the content of the debtor's schedules, and therefore it can
hardly be argued that the court accepts the debtor's position vis-4?-vis the
omitted asset.
1. CHAPTER 7 CASES
a. The Court Need Not and Does Not Accept the Debtor's Position
Bankruptcy petitions are strange. In any other kind of judicial
action, the pleadings or commencing papers usually require some state-
ment of entitlement to relief. Not so in bankruptcy. There are no ele-
ments to plead in a bankruptcy petition. There is no required "short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
in the conduct of trade) and in-bankruptcy honesty (what under the Statute of 4 Anne was called
"conformity"). See 4 Ann., c. 17 (1705) (Eng.); Charles Jordan Tabb, The Historical Evolution of
the Bankruptcy Discharge, 65 Am. BANKR. L.J. 325, 337 (1991). We are concerned solely with
the latter.
217. Chalik v. Moorefield (In re Chalik), 748 F.2d 616, 618 (11th Cir. 1984).
218. In re Rolland, 317 B.R. 402, 413 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2004).
219. Heidkamp v. Whitehead (In re Whitehead), 278 B.R. 589, 594 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2002).
220. In re Mohring, 142 B.R. 389, 393 (Bankr. E.D. Ca. 1992) (quoting Payne v. Wood, 775
F.2d 202, 205 (7th Cir. 1985)).
221. See, e.g., New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 750-51 (2001) ("[C]ourts regularly
inquire whether the party has succeeded in persuading a court to accept that party's earlier
position, so that judicial acceptance of an inconsistent position in a later proceeding would create
the perception that either the first or the second court was misled.") (internal quotations omitted);
United States v. Newell, 239 F.3d 917, 921 (7th Cir. 2001); cf Hossaini v. W. Mo. Med. Ctr., 140
F.3d 1140, 1143 (8th Cir. 1998) (observing the minority view that judicial estoppel does not
require acceptance of a position).
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relief."22 Official Form 1, the voluntary bankruptcy petition, calls only
for an individual consumer debtor's name, social security number and
address.223 It requires the debtor to sign and to check boxes pertaining
to venue, choice of chapter, and the like. 24 The only substantive
requirements in the Bankruptcy Code for the eligibility of an individual
debtor for bankruptcy relief are trifling jurisdictional requirements that
the debtor have some minimal connection with the United States.225
As an artifact of the historical development of bankruptcy law, 226 it
is the simple act of filing, not the content of the filing that entitles a
debtor to bankruptcy relief. The Bankruptcy Code acknowledges, real-
izes, or mandates this by also eliminating the need for a separate
adjudication:
A voluntary case under a chapter of this title is commenced by the
filing with the bankruptcy court of a petition under such chapter by
an entity that may be a debtor under such chapter. The commence-
ment of a voluntary case under a chapter of this title constitutes an
order for relief under such chapter.
2 27
The filing of the petition, therefore, is the order for relief. It is an essen-
tially performative speech act, the import of which is not its content but
the mere fact of its being made.228 The filing of the bankruptcy petition
is not unlike a confession of judgment with the simultaneous entry of the
222. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
223. Official Bankr. Form 1 (1991).
224. Id.
225. 11 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2000).
226. In the 19th century, bankruptcy cases were initiated by a creditor, who would be entitled
to have a debtor adjudicated as a bankrupt if the debtor committed an act of bankruptcy. The
creditor would plead and prove the act of bankruptcy occurred, whereupon the court would enter
the judgment adjudicating the debtor a bankrupt.
Courts fit voluntary bankruptcy cases under the 1898 Act into this same framework. Even
under the 1898 Act, however, there were truth-value propositions required in the voluntary
petition:
[T]he petition must state that "petitioner owes debts which he is unable to pay in
full," and "that he is willing to surrender all his property for the benefit of his
creditors, except such as is exempt by law." This establishes those facts so far as a
decree of bankruptcy is concerned, and he has committed an act of bankruptcy in
filing the petition. These are not issuable facts. ...
Hanover Nat. Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 190-91 (1902). There were, therefore, both pleading
and proof requirements in voluntary bankruptcy cases, albeit minimal ones. Thus, the order of
relief was "usually entered as a matter of course, in chambers and without any formal presentation
or hearing." CHARLES E. NADLER, THE LAW OF BANKrunoFrcv § 146 (1948). The entry of the
discharge, therefore, may have seemed automatic; however, many courts "zealously reiterated that
the granting of an order of adjudication is not a ministerial but a judicial act." Id. The insolvency
requirement was eliminated in 1938 for voluntary individual cases.
227. 11 U.S.C. § 301.
228. See J. L. AUSTIN, How To Do THINGS WITH WORDS 6-7 (J. 0. Urmson & Marina Sbisa
eds., 2d ed. 1975).
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judgment on behalf of all creditors collectively in the name of the
trustee.
When a petition is filed, an estate is created, but the content of the
estate does not depend on the scheduling of assets. The schedules do not
contain allegations, but merely serve the function of informing the trus-
tee of the property in which he or she has acquired an interest, somewhat
like discovery in aid of execution. Likewise, the schedules do not allege
the debtor's entitlement to discharge. In a Chapter 7 case, the discharge
follows, not from any facts alleged or asserted by the debtor, but, as 11
U.S.C. § 727 and Rule 4004 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Proce-
dure suggest, from no one's objecting or seeking dismissal of the
case. 2 9 Therefore, in the absence of a complaint commencing an adver-
sary proceeding to deny the debtor a discharge, the entitlement to a dis-
charge is merely a function of time. As such, courts have described the
entry of the order of discharge as ministerial.23 °
In short, the content of schedules has nothing to do with discharge.
Therefore, it is difficult to see how a court "accepts" a debtor's position
through discharge for purposes of invoking judicial estoppel.
b. There Is No Such Thing as a No-Asset Discharge
The filing of a bankruptcy petition invokes the elaborate Federal
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. One of the most significant is Rule
2002, which regulates most of the required notices in bankruptcy
cases.23' Creditors are entitled to notice that there is a bankruptcy case,
so that they may determine when they must file their proofs of claims.
Generally, creditors must file a proof of claim to receive a distribution,
and must do so within the statutory "bar date" to receive a distribution
that is of the same priority as other creditors.232 The bar date for ordi-
nary creditors is ninety days after the first date set for the meeting of
creditors.233 The notice of the bankruptcy case, therefore, must include
229. The debtor's entitlement is not put into question - that is, it does not become issuable -
unless there is a complaint filed and served that alleges some conduct listed in § 727. If a party
with standing to do so were to file such a complaint, alleging that the debtor concealed assets, then
the entitlement to discharge would be put at issue. And if the debtor responded that she listed all
of her assets, then there would be something the court could accept or not.
Section 727(c)(1) specifies that the trustee, a creditor, or the United States trustee may file
such a complaint. A non-creditor employer is not listed, although such a party may request that
the court order the trustee to investigate. 11 U.S.C. § 727(c)(2). In addition, the court might
conceivably enter an order sua sponte denying discharge. See, e.g., In re Burrell, 148 B.R. 820,
824 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1992) (court entered order providing that no order of discharge would be
entered in Chapter 7 case).
230. In re Hicks, 184 B.R. 954, 959 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995).
231. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002.
232. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 3002.
233. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3002(c).
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the date set for the meeting of creditors, and generally includes the bar
date.234
Where there are no assets, the filing and allowance of claims
becomes largely irrelevant. Rule 2002(e) addresses this possibility and
provides:
In a chapter 7 liquidation case, if it appears from the schedules that
there are no assets from which a dividend can be paid, the notice of
the meeting of creditors may include a statement to that effect; that it
is unnecessary to file claims; and that if sufficient assets become
available for the payment of a dividend, further notice will be given
for the filing of claims. 23 5
The purpose of the no-asset notice of Rule 2002(e) is not substantive, as
it has no effect on whether there actually is a distribution in a given case.
Rather, it "is merely a rule of administrative convenience to enable
clerks of court to reduce unnecessary paperwork. '236 It is appropriate
that Rule 2002(e) is not substantive, as it contains an "inherently fuzzy"
standard.237 It is difficult for "administrative personnel not trained in the
law" 238 to determine whether it really "appears from the schedules that
there are no assets.239
Furthermore, the only legal effect of a no-asset notice is procedural,
in that as a result of the notice, the claims allowance process is sus-
pended because there is no bar date. Rule 3002(c)(5) provides an excep-
tion to the 90-day bar date:
If notice of insufficient assets to pay a dividend was given to credi-
tors pursuant to Rule 2002(e), and subsequently the trustee notifies
the court that payment of a dividend appears possible, the clerk shall
notify the creditors of that fact and that they may file proofs of claim
within 90 days after the mailing of the notice.24°
Therefore, when and if the trustee notifies the clerk that there may be
assets for a distribution, the clerk sends an additional notice and the
claims allowance process begins. Since the only legal effect of a no-
asset notice is procedural,24 ' and does not relate to the discharge, there is
234. FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002(a).
235. FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002(e).
236. Costa v. Welch (In re Costa), 172 B.R. 954, 960 n.8 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1994).
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. FED. R. BANr, R. P. 2002(e).
240. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3002(c)(5).
241. There is one instance, however, in which a no-asset notice may have substantive effect.
The clerk's decision to send the no-asset notice, and the suspension of the claims allowance
process, may have some effect on the dischargeability of unscheduled debts under § 523(a)(3)(A).
See Lauren A. Helbling & Christopher M. Klein, The Emerging Harmless Innocent Omission
Defense to Nondischargeability under Bankruptcy Code § 523(a)(3)(A): Making Sense of the
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no such thing as a no-asset discharge.242
2. CHAPTER 13 CASES
Chapter 13 cases differ from Chapter 7 cases in a number of ways.
The timing and conditions of the discharge differ, as does the analysis of
whether, for purposes of judicial estoppel, the court "accepts" the
debtor's position as to an omitted asset. 43 A Chapter 13 debtor is gen-
erally entitled to a discharge only on completion of all of the payments
called for by a confirmed plan. 24  The Chapter 13 discharge, therefore,
has positive conditions, unlike the Chapter 7 discharge. If a Chapter 13
debtor omits an asset from his or her schedules, the position that the
debtor does not own any such asset might very well be accepted by the
court.
To obtain confirmation of a payment plan, the Chapter 13 debtor
must establish that the present value of the payments to holders of
allowed unsecured claims equals or exceeds the amounts that they would
receive in a Chapter 7 case.24 5 In a Chapter 7 case, the amounts that are
distributed by the trustee are not necessarily dependent on whether the
debtor has scheduled all of her assets; the trustee might discover and
liquidate unscheduled assets. On the other hand, in deciding whether to
confirm a Chapter 13 plan, the court performs a hypothetical liquidation
analysis, which is necessarily dependent on the full disclosure of availa-
ble assets. If the court enters a confirmation order based on the debtor's
false statement, there is a judgment that reflects the court's acceptance
of the debtor's position.
Confusion over Reopening Cases and Amending Schedules to Add Omitted Debts, 69 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 33, 42 (1995).
Thus, the debtor gains something from the no-asset notice only where the creditor does have
knowledge and sits idle. This is not exactly an abuse of the system. If it were, the creditors' due
process arguments would be more successful than they are. See, e.g., In re Medaglia, 52 F.3d at
455-57.
The no-asset notice makes no difference under § 523(a)(3)(B) because the notice has no
effect on the § 523(c) deadline to file a dischargeability complaint.
Despite this one substantive effect of a no-asset notice, the judicial estoppel cases do not
depend on whether the employer is a creditor who is affected by § 523(a)(3)(A). Indeed, the
judicial estoppel decisions do not even depend on whether there is, or might be, such a creditor.
242. Even if it did mean anything to speak of a "no-asset discharge," the existence such a thing
should make no difference to the proper application of judicial estoppel. Once the defendant
knows of the existence of both the bankruptcy case and the unscheduled claim, the defendant
would just have to notify the trustee to reopen the bankruptcy case and have the asset
administered. Consequently, the bankruptcy case would likely no longer be a no-asset case.
243. Another important difference between Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 is that a Chapter 13 case
remains open much longer. The bankruptcy court therefore has a longer period of time to correct
the consequences of omissions from the debtor's schedules.
244. See 11 U.S.C. § 1328 (2000).
245. Id. § 1325(a)(4).
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If a chose in action or its proceeds were exempt under state or fed-
eral law, the bottom line of the liquidation analysis would be unaffected
by the debtor's omission. In those cases, it could perhaps be argued that
it does not matter whether the debtor played fast and loose with the court
(or that the debtor could not have done so) because the result is the
same. However, if the trustee or the holder of an allowed unsecured
claim objects to plan confirmation, there is a second major requirement
before the court may approve the plan. The disposable-income test
requires the debtor, on objection by the trustee or the holder of an
allowed unsecured claim, to demonstrate that all of her "projected dis-
posable income" is being devoted to payments under the plan.2 46 The
disposable-income test does not differentiate between income that
would, when received, be exempt or not be exempt.247 Although there is
considerable confusion among the courts as to the definition of income
in Chapter 13,248 most courts have held that the proceeds of a pre-peti-
tion judgment are income.249 Therefore, if the debtor fails to disclose
the lawsuit, the court would be unable to determine whether or to what
extent the potential damages should be included in the disposable-
income calculation. A court might be inclined to consider such damages
income, and perhaps require that they be paid under the plan when and if
received, or decline to confirm a plan that failed to include a provision to
that effect. In the absence of disclosure, it could be said that the court
accepts the debtor's position in deciding whether the disposable-income
test is met.25 °
246. Id. § 1325(b)(1)(B).
247. See id. § 1325(b)(2).
248. Robert B. Chapman, The Bankruptcy of Haig-Simons? The Inequity of Equity and the
Definition of Income in Consumer Bankruptcy Cases, 10 Am. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 765, 796-815
(2002).
249. E.g., In re Pendleton, 225 B.R. 425, 427 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1998) (holding that recovery
on a pre-petition personal injury claim is income); In re Studer, 237 B.R. 189, 193 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 1998); Gaertner v. Claude (In re Claude), 206 B.R. 374, 380-81 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1997);
Watters v. McRoberts (In re McRoberts) 167 B.R. 146, 147 (S.D. Ill. 1994); see also In re
Tolliver, 257 B.R. 98, 101 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2000) (treating as income the proceeds of a pre-
petition workers compensation claim); In re Lush, 213 B.R. 152, 156 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1997).
Some courts, however, while not addressing damages, have advanced the naive rule that
"[tihe test is whether the asset in question is an anticipated stream of payments. If it is a stream of
payment, the payments must be included in projected income." McDonald v. Burgie (In re
Burgie), 239 BR. 406, 410 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1999); accord In re Baker, 194 B.R. 881, 885 (Bankr.
S.D. Cal. 1996). Under this rule, if the debtor receives a lump-sum satisfaction of the judgment,
the amount would not be income; if, however, the debtor received a series of payments, the
amount would be income. Of course, it is difficult to project, as of the confirmation hearing, how
the defendant is going to satisfy a possible judgment or how, in the event of settlement, the
payment will be structured. Suffice it to say that in the Ninth Circuit, whether the future proceeds
would or could be considered in calculating "projected disposable income" is a crap shoot.
250. Or not, if we are to take seriously the proposition that what to include or exclude from the
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C. What Should Be Done about Dishonesty? Judicial Estoppel and
Bankruptcy Policy
The arguments for the common use of bankruptcy-based judicial
estoppel, including that a debtor obtains a Chapter 7 no-asset discharge
as a result of omitting an asset from her schedules, generally result from
an incorrect understanding of bankruptcy law. This section lays out a
better statement of bankruptcy law, arguing that judicial estoppel is
inconsistent with fundamental bankruptcy policy as well as with bank-
ruptcy procedures. It also argues that because judicial estoppel is so
inconsistent, it can be undone by available bankruptcy procedures to
vindicate bankruptcy policy.
1. BANKRUPTCY POLICY
Any attempt to ground an argument in "bankruptcy policy" must
take into account the different opinions regarding the extent to which
bankruptcy should serve the needs and wishes of third parties, such as
communities, employees, or employer-defendants. Most contemporary
conceptions of a just bankruptcy law address two goals: one, the pay-
ment of creditors through a common pool; and two, the provision to the
debtor of some sort of fresh start."' There is considerable division,
however, over whether bankruptcy policy should be limited to these two
goals and if not, what other goals to pursue.252 Bankruptcy scholars
generally fall into one of two categories: proceduralists or traditional-
ists. 253 According to one description, "[t]he proceduralists view the sole
goal of bankruptcy as generating the highest return for creditors, while
traditionalists see a role in bankruptcy for protecting groups harmed by
calculation of disposable income is a matter of judicial discretion. See, e.g., In re Linden, 174
B.R. 769, 772 (C.D. Il. 1994).
251. Elizabeth Warren, A Principled Approach to Consumer Bankruptcy, 71 AM. BANR. L.J.
483, 483 (1997) ("By the second week of a basic course in bankruptcy, almost any law student can
recite in his or her sleep the two competing goals of consumer bankruptcy: a 'fresh start' for
debtors and equality of distribution for creditors. The two phrases are the twin stars of consumer
bankruptcy, reflecting the need for relief and the need for fairness, the balanced objectives of the
system."); Thomas H. Jackson, Of Liquidation, Continuation, and Delay: An Analysis of
Bankruptcy Policy and Nonbankruptcy Rules, 60 AM. BANKR. L.J. 399, 399 (1986) ("Apart from
giving human beings a financial fresh start, the recognized goal of bankruptcy law is ensuring that
creditors do not make a bad situation (insolvency) worse by engaging in a destructive race to the
debtor's assets."); see also JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS, 188-97 (1980).
252. Professor John Finnis observes that English bankruptcy law employs a variety of different
principles of distributional justice. FINNIS, supra note 251. The same can be said of American
bankruptcy law. Debates over the proper purpose and goals of bankruptcy law may be little more
than disagreements about whether a given principle is appropriate in a given context.
253. See generally Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy's Uncontested Axioms, 108 YALE L.J. 573,
576-80 (1998). Compare Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy:
A Reply to Warren, 54 U. CHI. L. Rav. 815 (1987), with Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54
U. CHI. L. REV. 775 (1987).
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failure, such as employees, tort victims, retirees, and even the surround-
ing community. '' 254 Accepting this division between proceduralists and
traditionalists, 255 it may be worthwhile to consider whether bankruptcy
policy, as articulated by the traditionalist approach or proceduralist
approach, would justify the application of judicial estoppel.
Among non-proceduralists, there is some variety of opinion as to
what purposes should be served by bankruptcy law. Very generally,
those who take a broader view want bankruptcy law to respect the com-
mutatively just demands against the debtor that are neither "claims" nor
"interests" for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.2 56 A few scholars have
254. Ted Janger, Crystals and Mud in Bankruptcy Law: Judicial Competence and Statutory
Design, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 559, 566 (2001). Professor Karen Gross, for example, maintains that
"[b]ankruptcy can and should further predetermined national social policy issues." KAREN GROSS,
FAILURE AND FORGIVENESS: REBALANCING THE BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM 243 (1997).
255. There are other axes and other ways of describing what might be the traditionalist-
proceduralist axis. One might say there is a more-free-market and less-free-market axis.
Scholars with varying degrees of faith in or commitment to free markets differ, for example, on
the question of whether corporate bankruptcy law should pursue the goal of protecting the jobs of
employees.
Some say that corporate bankruptcy law should take account of the interests of stakeholders
who are not creditors. See, e.g., Lawrence Ponoroff, Enlarging the Bargaining Table: Some
Implications of the Corporate Stakeholder Model for Federal Bankruptcy Proceedings, 23 CAP.
U. L. REV. 441 (1994); Karen Gross, Taking Community Interests Into Account in Bankruptcy: An
Essay, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1031 (1994). Others say it should not. See, e.g., Robert K. Rasmussen,
The Efficiency of Chapter 11, 8 BANKR. DEV. J. 319, 324 (1991). See generally Donald R.
Korobkin, The Role of Normative Theory in Bankruptcy Debates, 82 IowA L. REV. 75, 103-04
(1996) ("Traditional scholars generally affirm the critical claim that bankruptcy law should pursue
the jobs purpose as one of its purposes" but "freemarket critics argue that corporate bankruptcy
law (to the extent that it should exist at all) should not pursue the jobs purpose."). The free-
market axis is of dubious analytical value, given the ease with which scholars with opposing
viewpoints of what bankruptcy law should be can situate their preferred view as "free market."
Compare Todd J. Zywicki, Bankruptcy Law as Social Legislation, 5 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 393,
417 (2001), with TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY WESTBROOK, THE FRAGILE
MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT 420 (2000). See generally Chapman, supra note 10, at 354-
55. For purposes of this article, the taxonomy of the axes is not crucial.
256. See, e.g., Warren, supra note 253, at 787-88. There are also broader "societal" goals
advanced as appropriate for the bankruptcy system. One example is the goal of cultivating a
debtor's shame. See, e.g., A. Mechele Dickerson, Can Shame, Guilt, or Stigma Be Taught? Why
Credit-Focused Debtor Education May Not Work, 32 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 945, 950-51 (1999)
(describing the attached stigma as a benefit of mandatory debtor education); Edith H. Jones &
Todd J. Zywicki, It's Time for Means-Testing, 1999 B.Y.U. L. REV. 177, 219 (1999) (discussing
with disapproval the minimization of shame). But see Karen Gross, Preserving a Fresh Start for
the Individual Debtor: The Case for Narrow Construction of the Consumer Credit Amendments,
135 U. PA. L. REV. 59, 110 (1986) (discussing with approval the minimization of shame);
LoPucKi, supra note 5, at 473 (stating that ending "the vicious cycle of low self-esteem" should
be a main goal of any bankruptcy system).
Also discussed is how much emphasis should be given to the goal of debtors' economic self-
reliance. See generally Chapman, supra note 10, at 357; A. Mechele Dickerson, America's
Uneasy Relationship With the Working Poor, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 17, 67 (1999); Adam J. Hirsch,
Inheritance and Bankruptcy: The Meaning of the "Fresh Start", 45 HASTINGS L.J. 175, 203 n.91
(1994).
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addressed specifically the sorts of demands that should be considered. 7
Each suggests some form of dependence on the debtor and some form of
vulnerability to a proposal being considered by the bankruptcy court. 8
However, no extant substantive proposal suggests any benefit, or redress
of harm, should be afforded the debtor's employer or former employer.
A debtor's employer or former emplpyer, especially one who is a defen-
dant in an action brought by the debtor, does not make demands on the
debtor that the bankruptcy will unjustly deny.
Differences also can be found as to the relation between bankruptcy law and family values.
See, e.g., A. Mechele Dickerson, Family Values and the Bankruptcy Code: A Proposal to
Eliminate Bankruptcy Benefits Awarded on the Basis of Marital Status, 67 FORDHAm L. REV. 69,
70 (1998) (stating that "[e]ncouraging, supporting, and protecting marriage is not one of the goals
of federal bankruptcy laws"); cf Warren, supra note 11, at 40 (arguing that bankruptcy law and
policy should strengthen-or at least not weaken-the economic viability of the family unit).
Other differences can be found as to the relation between bankruptcy law and moral values,
and whether bankruptcy law should be molded to help restore a commitment to individual
responsibility. Compare Zywicki, supra note 255, at 428 ("[M]eans testing . . . strongly
vindicates the principle of personal responsibility by requiring debtors to live up to their
obligations to creditors to the extent that they can."), with Margaret Howard, Bankruptcy
Empiricism: Lighthouse Still No Good, 17 BANK. DEV. J. 425, 450 (2001) (reviewing SULLIVAN,
WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 255) ("[M]eans testing is nothing more than a disciplinary
measure, designed primarily to check and regulate debtor behavior. It is not about 'fairness' to
creditors at all, and assurances that it is 'not intended to be punitive' ring hollow. On the contrary,
that is exactly what it is intended to be.").
257. E.g., GRoss, supra note 254, at 229 (suggesting anyone with a "nexus with the debtor for
whom there is substantial injury caused by the bankruptcy filing and . . . an injury redressable
through the reorganization process"); Nathalie D. Martin, Noneconomic Interests in Bankruptcy:
Standing on the Outside Looking In, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 429 (1998); Donald R. Korobkin,
Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of Bankruptcy, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 717 (1991).
258. Professor Warren's examples, in the context of business bankruptcy, include the interests
of "[o]lder employees who could not have retrained for other jobs, customers who would have to
resort to less attractive, alternative suppliers of goods and services, suppliers who would have lost
current customers, nearby property owners who would have suffered declining property values,
and states or municipalities that would have faced shrinking tax bases benefit from the
reorganization's success." Warren, supra note 253, at 787-88.
Professor Martin also gives a few examples: The debtor is a nursing home and the affected
persons are "elderly persons with long-term, below-market contracts with the debtor, under which
these persons prepaid (primarily through federal subsidies) for extended life care." Martin, supra
note 257, at 462. Neighbors of a "local neighborhood bar and grill . . . [located in an old ethnic
neighborhood in a large city" who feel that the plans to convert the bar and grill into a "strip joint"
will "corrupt the neighborhood." Id. at 463. The debtor is a manufacturer and there are two bids
to purchase its assets out of chapter 11, under one of which the employees will lose their jobs. Id.
at 463-64.
Professor Gross's and Professor Korobkin's examples are similar. Professor Marjorie Girth
criticizes Professor Gross's definition of "community" for excluding those affected by consumer
bankruptcies. Marjorie L. Girth, Rethinking Fairness in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 73 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 449, 472 (1999). Gross responds that community interests also arise in consumer bankruptcy.
"For example, the interests of a debtor's family is a 'community' worthy of attention; thus,
insuring that the debtor has sufficient income with which to support his/her family is a necessary
piece of any good bankruptcy legislation." Karen Gross, On the Merits: A Response to Professors
Girth and White, 73 AM. BAKRR. L.J. 485, 486 (1999); see also Elizabeth Warren, Bankrupt
Children, 86 Minn. L. Rev. 1003, 1024 (2002).
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Neither the proceduralist nor non-proceduralist approaches support
the application of judicial estoppel to omitted causes of action. Under
either approach it transgresses the boundaries of desirable bankruptcy
policy. Each school of thought recognizes the centrality of the common
pool of assets. For example, Professors Douglas Baird and Thomas
Jackson maintain that the central principle of bankruptcy law is max-
imization of the estate for the benefit of creditors." 9 Professor Warren
rejects this view in favor of a "loss allocation" view of bankruptcy,
which depicts bankruptcy law as "an attempt to reckon with a debtor's
multiple defaults and to distribute the consequences among a number of
different actors." 6 ' Professor Warren thus focuses on the distributional
justice to other parties besides creditors. 26'
Deciding who is included as a beneficiary of the common pool can
affect the definition of the common pool. For example, one of the
debtor's valuable rights may be the right to terminate employees. If we
like employees enough, we might make them beneficiaries of the com-
mon pool, even though they are neither creditors nor equity-holders.
Alternatively, if the common pool's beneficiaries are creditors only, we
might propose to hold the right to fire employees outside the pool, keep-
ing it from being exercised for the benefit of creditors and allowing, or
requiring, it to be exercised only for the benefit of employees. Because
there is no special reason to prefer the defendant/employer, there is no
reason to keep the chose-in-action out of the common pool for the bene-
fit of the defendant/employer.
Once the appropriate legislature has issued a judgment as to the
distributional justice of the scope and beneficiaries of the common pool,
the debtor has an obligation (as a matter of commutative justice between
debtor and trustee, as representative of the estate) to disclose all assets in
order to achieve fair administration of the common pool. When the
debtor breaches that obligation, there is a need for corrective justice.
That correction may take one or more of a variety of forms, including
criminal punishment.262 On the civil side, there are a variety of methods
to ensure that bankruptcy policy is served. Assuming there is no distri-
butional principle that requires protecting the defendant/employer, the
259. Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganization and the Treatment of
Diverse Ownership Interest: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in
Bankruptcy, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 97, 109-10 (1984).
260. Warren, supra note 253, at 777.
261. Id. at 787-88.
262. It is a crime, for instance, to "knowingly and fraudulently concea[l] from a custodian,
trustee, marshal, or other officer of the court charged with the control or custody of property, or, in
connection with a case under title 11, from creditors or the United States Trustee, any property
belonging to the estate of a debtor." 18 U.S.C. § 152(1) (2000).
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question remains what procedures bankruptcy law offers to correct the
debtor's omission of employment discrimination claims.
2. BANKRUPTCY AS PROCEDURE
One bankruptcy proceduralist, Professor Charles Mooney, has
given an account of bankruptcy law that is quite useful in determining
whether and how the judicial estoppel cases fit into bankruptcy policy.
Professor Mooney recently argued that bankruptcy law is "a subset of
the law of civil procedure." '263 Central to this conception is the stated
purpose of bankruptcy law:
Procedure theory holds that the goal of bankruptcy law as a system is
to maximize the recoveries or other benefits for the debtor's right-
sholders. A corollary of this principle recognizes the procedural char-
acter of procedure theory: Bankruptcy law should take substantive
legal entitlements of rightsholders as it finds them, honoring both
powers and limitations under nonbankruptcy law.264
Under Professor Mooney's conception, "[p]rocedural law, includ-
ing bankruptcy law, should further, enhance, and vindicate, but not dis-
rupt, policies that nonbankruptcy law creates and seeks to
implement." 265 Professor Mooney argues that most of the significant
rules of bankruptcy law, even the ones that apparently modify the rights
of various rightsholders, are consistent with his proceduralist view of
bankruptcy.266 Thus, for instance, the automatic stay,267 the definition
of the estate, 268 and the trustee's avoiding powers 269 are consistent with
the proceduralist view of maximizing creditor recovery but do not sub-
stantially modify pre-bankruptcy rights. Aspects of bankruptcy law that
cannot be squared with the procedure-based goals, Professor Mooney
suggests, should be changed.27°
If bankruptcy law is procedure, and if its goals are limited to or
include maximizing creditor recovery, then bankruptcy law should have
procedures to address any action that discomfits that goal. We thus take
bankruptcy's "substantive" and "procedural" law as one and consider
whether bankruptcy provides procedures for addressing a debtor's omis-
sion of assets.
263. Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Normative Theory of Bankruptcy Law: Bankruptcy As (Is)
Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 931, 937 (2004).
264. Id.
265. Id. at 944.
266. Id. at 1011-60.
267. id. at 1027-28.
268. Id. at 1013-14.
269. Id. at 1028-37.
270. Id. at 1060-61.
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3. IF BANKRUPTCY HAS ITS OWN PROCEDURES, JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL
IS UNNECESSARY
Before examining whether bankruptcy law, viewed as a procedural
system, has its own means of vindicating the policy that honesty is
required in order to maximize creditor recovery, we take a short detour.
In this section we explain why judicial estoppel is unnecessary if bank-
ruptcy law does in fact have such means.
One might reasonably expect that if the accuracy of the debtor's
schedules is as important to the bankruptcy system as it is to the realiza-
tion of the normative goal of making the value of the debtor's assets
available to creditors, there would be systemic methods of vindicating
that interest. Of course, the district courts that invoke judicial estoppel
could be said to be invoking an equitable doctrine to prevent a legal
strategist (the plaintiff/debtor) from obtaining a "system-unintended
result" '271 (obtaining a damages award she will not have to share with the
bankruptcy trustee) and thus to vindicate an interest of, or a function
necessary to a goal of, the judicial system (honesty or consistency). On
the other hand, the bankruptcy system may be separate from the rest of
the judicial system. The bankruptcy system may have its own means of
preventing a debtor from acting strategically to obtain a system-unin-
tended result. Furthermore, the district courts' application of judicial
estoppel may merely substitute one system-unintended result for
another. That inconsistency may suggest a malfunction. 72
a. Judicial Estoppel as Error-Correction
One influential student work describes the absolute form of judicial
estoppel as activated by a concern for truth:
The paramount attribute of this form of judicial estoppel is that it
operates to prevent even the taint of untruth from entering the judicial
process. One function of judicial proceedings is "to seek truth"; this
rule places truth in a preeminent position. It proceeds from the pre-
mise that "truth is not a weather vane. It does not veer when the
winds of self-interest change. It remains constant." Thus, it follows
from the absolute nature of truth that once a party has taken a posi-
tion under oath, "a court has the right, if not the duty, to hold that
party to that position, ... by assuming in his behalf utter good faith in
the first instance, to reproduce such assumption later, even to his
hurt." If a party is free in later proceedings to vary his sworn posi-
tion, then in one instance the judicial oath is violated and a lie is
271. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Systems Approach to Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 479, 507-08
(1997).
272. See id. at 506.
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permitted to enter the judicial process. The absolute rule asserts that
there will always be but one "true" position on a given set of facts,
and hence no deceit can tarnish the public's perception of the courts
273as a truthseeking institution.
Bankruptcy-based judicial estoppel, like the absolute form described
above, relies on the coherence theory of truth. Unfortunately, that
coherence may be inconsistent with the application of the correspon-
dence theory of truth. That is, the position maintained in the second
suit-that the second suit exists-is obviously and demonstrably true;
the commitment to coherence, however, may require the perpetuation of
the obvious, demonstrated falseness of the first position-that the sec-
ond suit does not exist.
Although the absolute form of judicial estoppel is said to foster
confidence in the integrity of the judicial system, consistency of false-
ness may undermine the "public's perception of the courts as a truth-
seeking institution. '274 The non-absolute version of judicial estoppel,
therefore, precludes a party from taking an inconsistent position only
when the first court has accepted it.275
Clearly, the existence of the lawsuit the second court is hearing, the
fact of the bankruptcy case, and the fact that the discrimination claim
was commenced before the bankruptcy must be acknowledged as corre-
sponding to reality. As a matter of correspondence, each debtor in the
cases detailed earlier in this article did in fact own an employment dis-
crimination claim as of the commencement of the bankruptcy case, as
conclusively evidenced by the fact that an employment discrimination
claim was pending at that time. Granting relief in accord with that real-
ity, however, may create an incoherence, viz., that the debtor did not
own the cause of action when she appeared in the bankruptcy court and
does own the cause of action when she appears before the district court.
The judicial system, posited as some kind of totality whose integrity is at
stake, has previously assigned the truth-value "false" to the statement
that the debtor owns this cause of action; now that the debtor appears as
a plaintiff in this cause of action, there is a conflict between experience
and the field of truth-values. A reevaluation of the statement regarding
the debtor's ownership would entail reevaluation of other statements
because of their logical interconnection. 6
The appropriateness of adhering to a coherence theory of truth by
using judicial estoppel in the second case depends on whether the rest of
273. Rand G. Boyers, Comment, Precluding Inconsistent Statements: The Doctrine of Judicial
Estoppel, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 1244, 1254 (1986) (footnotes omitted).
274. Id.
275. Id. at 1256.
276. See William Van Orman Quine, Two Dogmas of Empricism, 60 PHIL. REV. 20, 39 (1951).
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the field of propositions can be adjusted to reflect the proposition that
we now recognize to be true. In law, the "latitude of choice as to what
statements to reevaluate" '277 is governed, in large part, by the rules as to
the finality of judgments. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59 and 60,
for example, provide limits on the extent to which the truth-value
assigned by former adjudication can be re-evaluated; where they cannot,
the demands of coherence and consistency may be such that the adjust-
ment should be made in the latter adjudication. Where the former adju-
dication was a bankruptcy case, however, "there is much latitude of
choice" '278 as to the procedural means by which to make the appropriate
reevaluations that will satisfy both correspondence and coherence. And
it is precisely the fact that the bankruptcy court does not accept the origi-
nal position (and even if it did, it has the ability to undo that acceptance)
that makes the non-absolute form of judicial estoppel unnecessary.
b. Judicial Estoppel as an Amorphous Form of Preclusion
When a party can invoke either claim preclusion or issue preclu-
sion, judicial estoppel is unnecessary. The party to be estopped loses
because she is being consistent with that which has already been adjudi-
cated as false.2 7 9 Likewise, the party to be estopped loses if her position
is inconsistent with that which has already been adjudicated.28 ° Judicial
estoppel serves a much more important (although questionable) function
when other preclusion doctrines are not available. It is a form of preclu-
sion that can be invoked when the claim and issue preclusion do not
apply.28'
An illustration appears in New Hampshire v. Maine, in which the
Supreme Court faced Maine's assertions that New Hampshire's claims
were barred by claim preclusion, issue preclusion, and judicial estop-
pel.282 The Court offered black letter and elemental definitions of claim
and issue preclusion and concluded "that a discrete doctrine, judicial
estoppel, best fits the controversy."'2 83 Claim preclusion would not have
been appropriate because New Hampshire's claim was not identical to
the claim in the earlier suit; issue preclusion would not have been appro-
priate because the former litigation was compromised rather than "actu-
277. Id. at 39-40
278. Id. at 39.
279. See Boyers, supra note 273, at 1247.
280. See id.
281. See, e.g., Note, The Doctrine of Preclusion Against Inconsistent Positions in Judicial
Proceedings, 59 HARV. L. REv. 1132, 1134 (1946).
282. New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 748 (2001).
283. Id. at 749.
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ally litigated. '284 To preclude New Hampshire's claim, the Court had to
extend beyond the limits of claim preclusion and issue preclusion.
The existence of judicial estoppel makes a certain kind of sense
when the other preclusion doctrines are unavailable because no judg-
ment has been entered or because the prior matter was not "actually
litigated. 285 Historically, judicial estoppel made sense when the major
preclusion doctrines-then called res judicata and collateral estoppel-
each contained a relatively strict requirement of mutuality. 286 However,
as the requirements of the preclusion doctrines become more relaxed and
the reach of those doctrines broadens, judicial estoppel's import
narrows.
4. BANKRUPTCY HAS ITS OWN PROCEDURES
When a debtor files inaccurate schedules, thereby compromising
the proper functioning of the bankruptcy process, courts focus on the
harm done to creditors. "The statutes are designed to insure that com-
plete, truthful, and reliable information is put forward at the outset of the
proceedings, so that decisions can be made by the parties in interest
based on fact rather than fiction." '287 Similarly, the accuracy of the
schedules is important because "[c]reditors are entitled to judge for
themselves what will benefit, and what will prejudice, them." 288 How-
ever, it is unnecessary for courts to resort to judicial estoppel to address
this issue of dishonest debtors. Bankruptcy law, considered as proce-
dure, already provides methods to handle a debtor's dishonesty and to
prevent creditors from being deprived of the value of that civil action.289
Once the estate acquires an interest in a debtor's civil action (once
the claim becomes property of the estate), the civil action can cease
being property of the estate only by the means provided in the Bank-
ruptcy Code. For example, the trustee may dispose of the civil action by
abandonment. However, the debtor's failure to list the civil action as an
asset on the bankruptcy schedules cannot deprive the trustee or the estate
of its rights to that asset. To the extent the debtor tries to deprive the
284. Id. at 748-49.
285. See Boyers, supra note 273, at 1247.
286. See, e.g., The Doctrine of Preclusion Against Inconsistent Positions in Judicial
Proceedings, supra note 281, at 1246-47.
287. Boroff v. Tully (In re Tully), 818 F.2d 106, 110 (1st Cir. 1987) (emphasis added); see
also Hamo v. Wilson (In re Hamo), 233 B.R. 718, 725 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 1999); E. Diversified
Distribs., Inc., v. Matus (In re Matus), 303 B.R. 660, 675 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2004); Posilico v.
Bratcher (In re Bratcher), 289 B.R. 205, 218 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2003); Kavanagh v. Leija (In re
Leija), 270 B.R. 497, 501 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2001).
288. Chalik v. Moorefield (In re Chalik), 748 F.2d 616, 618 (11th Cir. 1984) (emphasis
added).
289. See, e.g., Walker & Nickell, supra note 9, at 1115-16.
2005]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
estate of the value of the civil action, the bankruptcy system is designed
to ensure that one of two things will happen: one, the debtor will fail
because his or her efforts will be detected and thwarted; or, two, the
debtor will temporarily succeed, in which case her apparent success will
be either void or voidable.29 ° Either way, the very nature of the bank-
ruptcy system is designed so that, short of burning cash or otherwise
destroying assets, the debtor will fail to deprive the estate of the value of
the civil action.
a. No Sale or Abandonment
Obviously, the trustee cannot sell a claim of which she has no
knowledge. Similarly, there can be no abandonment of estate property if
the trustee has no knowledge of the asset. If there is no transfer, the
asset remains property of the estate.29" ' Although the trustee may aban-
don property to the debtor after notice and an opportunity for a hear-
ing,"' and may "technically abandon" scheduled property merely by
failing to administer it, 293 unscheduled property which is not adminis-
tered is not abandoned and remains property of the estate.294
Because Chapter 7 cases are routinely closed within a few months
of commencement, it is likely that employers in employment discrimina-
tion cases will seek summary judgment after the Chapter 7 case is
closed. If a Chapter 7 trustee files a final report and final account, and if
no party objects within thirty days, "there shall be a presumption that the
estate has been fully administered. '295 At this point, the court is to dis-
charge the trustee and close the case.296 When the estate is closed,
scheduled but unadministered property is abandoned.297 Unscheduled
property and unadministered property is not abandoned and remains
property of the estate, thereby thwarting dishonest debtors from achiev-
ing their goal of depriving the estate of valuable assets.
b. Reopening Chapter 7 Cases
Although the courts' interest in punishing a debtor they perceive to
290. Of course, the omission could go undetected. But if the omission of the claim is not
detected by the defendant and remedied through bankruptcy procedure, there will be no motion to
dismiss or motion for summary judgment based on judicial estoppel either.
291. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Matouk (In re Hayes), 322 B.R. 644 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2005).
292. 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (2000).
293. Id. § 554(c); Helms v. Arboleda (In re Arboleda), 224 B.R. 640, 645 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1998); Cooper v. Walker (In re Walker), 151 B.R. 1006, 1008 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1993).
294. 11 U.S.C. § 554(d). Unscheduled property remains property of the estate and is not
abandoned even if the trustee is aware of it. Jeffrey v. Desmond, 70 F.3d 183, 186 (1st Cir. 1995).
295. FED. R. BANKR. P. 5009.
296. 11 U.S.C. § 350(a).
297. Id. § 554(c).
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be manipulating the system seems somewhat understandable, one inter-
est at stake is "to vindicate creditors interests" - after they have been
deprived of the value of the concealed or unscheduled asset - by reopen-
ing the case to allow the trustee to administer the asset. 298 Bankruptcy
courts may reopen Chapter 7 cases to allow the debtor to schedule as an
asset a chose-in-action that was previously omitted. When it appears to
a bankruptcy judge that a valuable asset of an estate has not been admin-
istered, the judge has a duty, either on the application of a party or sua
sponte, to reopen the case for the administration of the asset.29 9 Upon
reopening the case, a trustee may be appointed if "the court determines
that a trustee is necessary to protect the interests of creditors and the
debtor or to insure efficient administration of the case."" It would
seem that if the lawsuit has value, the appointment of a trustee would be
in the interests of the creditors and of the debtor, and necessary to the
efficient administration of the estate.
Once the estate has been reopened and a trustee appointed, the trus-
tee is able to administer the asset. The trustee may either sell the chose-
in-action, litigate the case, or abandon it to the debtor. Assuming the
action has value but the trustee cannot find a ready market for employ-
ment discrimination lawsuits, the trustee would most likely litigate the
action. In cases in which the debtor already brought suit on the claim,
the possible recovery for the benefit of the estate depends on whether
any already-entered summary judgment would have effect on the trustee.
If the chose-in-action is no longer estate property, it is so for one of
two reasons: one, the asset has been transferred from the estate; or, two,
the asset no longer exists. If it has been transferred by the debtor in a
lawsuit, reopening the case would be beneficial because it would permit
the trustee to seek to undo what the district court has done; the transfer
would have to be avoided for the property to return to the estate.
(i) Judicial Estoppel as "Transfer" in Violation of the
Automatic Stay
When a bankruptcy case is commenced, the filing of the petition
"operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, ' 1 of a number of acts.
Section 362(a)(1) prohibits the commencement or continuation of a judi-
cial proceeding against the debtor of an action that was or could have
been commenced before the bankruptcy case commenced.3 °2 Section
298. Hadlock v. Dolliver (In re Dolliver), 255 B.R. 251, 258 (Bankr. D. Me. 2000).
299. Mullendore v. United States (In re Mullendore), 741 F.2d 306, 308 (10th Cir. 1984).
300. FED. R. BANKR. P. 5010.
301. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).
302. Id. § 362(a)(1).
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362(a)(3) prohibits any act to obtain possession or exercise control over
property of the estate.3 °3 The stay continues with respect to acts against
the debtor until the earliest of the time the bankruptcy case is closed, the
bankruptcy case is dismissed, or a discharge is granted or denied.3 °4
In determining whether the use of judicial estoppel violates the
automatic stay, the first matter to consider is whether summary judg-
ment during the bankruptcy case would be construed as a continuation
of an action against the debtor in violation of the stay. That is certainly
the case when the debtor is a defendant.30 5 The Eleventh Circuit has
gone so far as to hold that the stay "prevents this court from issuing its
opinion" in an appeal in which the defendant-appellee filed a chapter 11
petition after oral argument but before the issuing of an opinion. 30 6
However, many courts hold that § 362(a)(1) applies only when the
debtor is the defendant and does not prevent the non-debtor defendant
from defending against the plaintiff/debtor's civil action.3 7 Similarly,
courts hold that a defendant seeking summary judgment in an action by
the debtor is not exercising possession or control over the action within
the proscription of § 362(a)(3).3 °8
Technically, therefore, it might be said that the entry of summary
judgment against the debtor in an unscheduled lawsuit is not a violation
of the stay.30 9  Nonetheless, conceding the "technical" point, the
debtor's continued litigation of the unscheduled lawsuit violates one of
the primary purposes of the automatic stay:
"The primary purposes of the automatic stay provisions are to effec-
tively stop all creditor collection efforts, stop all harassment of a
debtor seeking relief, and to maintain the status quo between the
debtor and [his] creditors, thereby affording the parties and the Court
an opportunity to appropriately resolve competing economic interests
in an orderly and effective way."31 °
303. Id. § 362(a)(3).
304. Id. § 362(c).
305. See, e.g., Ellis v. Consol. Diesel Elec. Corp., 894 F.2d 371 (10th Cir. 1990).
306. Ellison v. Nw Eng'g Co., 707 F.2d 1310, 1311 (1lth Cir. 1983).
307. E.g., Martin-Trigona v. Champion Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 892 F.2d 575, 577 (7th Cir.
1989); cf. Resorts Int'l, Inc. v. Lowenschuss (In re Lowenschuss), 67 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1995).
308. E.g., Martin-Trigona, 892 F.2d at 577.
309. A literal reading of § 362 would also suggest that the debtor violates the stay by
presuming to continue litigation. However, a literal interpretation of § 362 is not immune from
criticism. Under a literal or "plain meaning" approach to § 362, its application to "all entities"
would include the debtor, who would be prohibited from exercising control over estate property.
Such an interpretation would, for example, prevent the debtor from exercising enough control over
estate property to turn property over to the trustee or from continuing to live in her house during
the administration of the chapter 7 case.
310. Taylor v. Slick, 178 F.3d 698, 702 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Zeoli v. RIHT Mortg. Corp.,
148 BR. 698, 700 (D.N.H. 1993)); see also 40235 Wash. St. Corp. v. Lusardi, 177 F. Supp. 2d
1090, 1103-04 (S.D. Cal. 2001). Similar policies include "to protect creditors by promoting the
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As one court has put it, the goal of the automatic stay is to avoid a
"free-for-all in which opposing interests maneuver to capture the lion's
share of the debtor's assets. 311 Some courts also assert that the stay
negates post-petition transfers of the debtor's property.312 Assuming the
desirability of such a policy, the automatic stay could reasonably be held
to prohibit a non-debtor, who is a defendant, from seeking dismissal or
judgment in a suit brought by the debtor, and to prohibit the debtor from
doing the same. Therefore, the case would be stayed until the trustee is
afforded the opportunity to intervene or to abandon the chose-in-action
to the debtor, at which point the action would no longer be property of
the estate and there would be no bar to anyone's attempting to possess,
control, or destroy it.
Assuming that entry of summary judgment is not violative of the
stay, we might question what exactly entitles the defendant/employer to
summary judgment. If the debtor's failure to schedule the lawsuit cre-
ates the right to judgment, might not the failure to schedule the lawsuit
be violative of the stay? There is authority that a transfer of property by
the debtor is void ab initio as a violation of the automatic stay; 3 13 the
greater weight of authority, however, holds that the stay does not apply
to transfers by the debtor.314 There is also authority, however, that
neither a debtor's bringing of a judicial action,315 nor the plaintiff/
debtor's dismissal of such an action violates the automatic stay. 3 16 This
authority would support the position that the debtor's failure to schedule
a lawsuit, inasmuch as it affects a transfer of the debtor's rights to the
defendant/employer, is not void as a violation of the automatic stay.31 7
(ii) Judicial Estoppel as an Unauthorized Post-Petition Transfer
The decisions denying that the debtor may violate the stay do not
leave the debtor with untrammeled discretion to dispose of estate prop-
erty. Indeed, "section 549 picks up where the automatic stay leaves
off. ' 3 18 If the entry of judgment based on bankruptcy-based judicial
estoppel is a disposition other than by the debtor, it may be an unautho-
rized post-petition transfer that is voidable under § 549. Section 549 is
bankruptcy policy of equality of distribution among claimants" and "to promote the orderly
administration of the bankruptcy estate." WILLIAm L. NORTON, JR., NORTON BANKRUPrcY LAW
AND PRACTICE § 36:4 (2d ed. 2004).
311. Sunshine Dev., Inc. v. FDIC, 33 F.3d 106, 114 (1st Cir. 1994).
312. In re Soares, 107 F.3d 969, 976 (1st Cir. 1997).
313. E.g., Edwards v. Heartwood 11, Inc. 590 S.E.2d 734 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003).
314. E.g., Schwartz v. United States (In re Schwartz), 954 F.2d 569, 574 (9th Cir. 1992).
315. Martin-Trigona v. Champion Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 892 F.2d 575 (7th Cir. 1989).
316. In re Convention Masters, Inc., 46 B.R. 339 (Bankr. D. Md. 1985).
317. See id.
318. In re Schwartz, 954 F.2d at 574.
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one of the sections that detail the trustee's avoidance powers, which are
designed to increase the value of the estate by recovering the value of
property disposed of after the case is commenced.3 19
The elements of a § 549 action are simple: the trustee must plead
and prove that (1) property of the estate (2) was transferred (3) after the
filing of a petition and (4) that transfer was not authorized by Bank-
ruptcy Code or by court.32 ° Section 550 states generally that the trustee
may recover from the transferee the value of the property transferred for
the benefit of the estate.321
Because it has already been established that a pre-petition chose-in-
action is property of the estate, the first element of a § 549 is met.322
The next issue is whether the debtor's failure to schedule the lawsuit, to
the extent that it gives rise to a right of dismissal in the defendant, is a
transfer. The Bankruptcy Code defines "transfer" to include "every
mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involun-
tary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in prop-
erty. ' 323 The definition of transfer is broad enough to include acts that
might not ordinarily or intuitively be considered transfers. The defini-
tion includes, for example, an election to carry net operating losses for-
ward to future taxable years instead of back to prior ones.32 4
Broadly applying the definition of "transfer," courts have held that
the elimination of an intangible right or of a chose-in-action is a transfer.
For example, courts have found that the satisfaction of mortgage by the
debtor/mortgagee, 325 redemption of shares of corporate stock,3 26 and a
release of claims by the debtor against a third party, 327 are all transfers.
Finally, courts have also held that judgments, whether entered against
319. E.g., Samuel A. Caulfield, Fraudulent and Preferential Conveyances of the Insolvent
Multinational Corporation, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 571, 618 (1997).
320. 11 U.S.C. § 549(a) (2000); Moratzka v. Visa U.S.A. (In re Calstar, Inc.), 159 B.R. 247,
252 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1993).
321. 11 U.S.C. § 550 (a).
322. See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
323. 11 U.S.C. § 101(54).
324. Towers v. United States (In re Feiler), 218 B.R. 957, 962 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1998), affd,
230 B.R. 164 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1999), aff'd, 218 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 2000).
325. Dolata v. Dolata (In re Dolata), 306 B.R. 97, 118-19 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2004).
326. See, e.g., Consove v. Cohen (In re Roco Corp.), 701 F.2d 978, 985 (1st Cir. 1983); cf,
e.g., PHP Liquidating, LLC v. Robbins, 291 B.R. 592, 600-02 (D. Del. 2003) (holding that trustee
could not avoid prepetition stock redemption unless shareholder received less than reasonably
equivalent value); Corporate Jet Aviation, Inc. v. Vantress (In re Corporate Jet Aviation, Inc.), 57
B.R. 195, 197 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1986).
327. Bernstein v. Safe Alternatives Corp. of Am. (In re Bernstein), 246 B.R. 742, 743 (Bankr.
D. Conn. 2000) (holding that a trustee could avoid, as post-petition transfer, debtor's purported
waiver of right to receive salary earned pre-petition); FBN Food Servs., Inc. v. River Bank Am.
(In re FBN Food Servs., Inc.), 185 B.R. 265, 272 (N.D. I11. 1995).
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the debtor as defendant 328 or against the debtor as plaintiff,329 constitute
transfers for purposes of trustee avoidance.
In judicial estoppel cases, there are two possible unauthorized
transfers: one, the district court's entry of summary judgment or dismis-
sal; or, two, the debtor's omission of the action from the schedules. In
the first situation, it might be said that the debtor owns the claim until
the district court says otherwise; in the second situation, it might be said
that the transfer is that which entitles the defendant to judgment. Which
event causes the debtor to part with her rights, and which therefore is the
transfer, depends on whether the district court's judgment is considered
declarative or constitutive of the plaintiff/debtor's right to relief. In
either case, however, a valuable interest has been lost and there has
been, therefore, a transfer. The second element of a § 549 action is
therefore satisfied.
The third element of a § 549 action requires that the transfer occur
post-petition. The district court's judgment must necessarily be post-
petition. Therefore, the only potential issue, where the debtor's failure
to schedule the lawsuit is considered the transfer, is whether such con-
duct occurred post-petition. Section 521(1) requires the debtor to file a
schedule of assets.330 The timing of the filing, however, is prescribed by
the bankruptcy rules, local rules, and local standing orders. Rule 1007
of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure permits the debtor to file
schedules as late as fifteen days after filing the petition.331 Indeed, some
courts have characterized the debtor's failure to schedule the asset as
"post-petition" and, in so doing, stated that "any post-petition conduct
by [the plaintiff/debtor], including failure to disclose an asset, does not
relate to the merits of the discrimination claim," because the claim
became property of the estate upon filing of the petition.332 Therefore,
the third element of a § 549 action is met.33 3
328. Perkins v. Petro Supply Co. (In re Rexplore Drilling, Inc.), 971 F.2d 1219, 1225 (6th Cir.
1992). The issue of whether there is a transfer is perhaps inseparable from the issue of standing.
One court has held, without reference to § 549, that a debtor's defensive appellate rights were
estate property that the debtor could not lawfully transfer. Mozer v. Goldman (In re Mozer), 302
B.R. 892, 895-96 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
329. Besing v. Hawthorne (In re Besing), 981 F.2d 1488, 1494 (5th Cir. 1993).
330. 11 U.S.C. § 521(1) (2000).
331. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1007(c).
332. Parker v. Wendy's Int'l, Inc., 365 F.3d 1268, 1272 n.80 (11th Cir. 2004).
333. If the transfer discussed above does not occur post-petition, it must occur either pre-
petition or during the Augenblick at which the petition is filed. In deference to theorists of time
from Zeno to Stephen Hawking, I ignore the second possibility. A pre-petition transfer alters very
little from the analysis above.
Section 548 allows the trustee to avoid "fraudulent transfers." See 11 U.S.C. § 548. There
are two kinds of fraudulent transfers - those with actual fraudulent intent and those that are
considered constructively fraudulent. A transfer with actual fraudulent intent is any voluntary or
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The fourth and final element of a § 549 action requires that the
post-petition transfer be unauthorized by the bankruptcy court or the
Bankruptcy Code. To the extent that the district court's dismissal is
predicated upon the notion that omission of the claim from debtor's
schedules violates § 521, and thus potentially works a fraud upon the
bankruptcy court, 3 1 it is to be taken for granted that the transfer is unau-
thorized by the potentially defrauded court. The fourth element of § 549
is therefore also satisfied.
Therefore, since all elements of a § 549 action are met, a trustee,
aware that a court has dismissed a debtor's pre-petition cause of action
because the debtor failed to schedule the asset, should have no difficulty
in pleading a § 549 action against the defendant/employer in the bank-
ruptcy court. Moreover, the trustee who is able to prove the pleaded
facts is likely to recover, from the employer, the value of the lawsuit for
the benefit of the estate.335 In response to a § 549 action, however, the
employer may interpose the statute of limitations on the trustee's avoid-
ance action. Section 549(d) provides that a § 549 action may not be
commenced after the earlier of two years after the date of the transfer
sought to be avoided, or the time the case is closed or dismissed.3 36
Given that employers typically seek summary judgment only after the
bankruptcy case is closed,3 37 the limitation period often expires well
before a trustee even knows that there was a transfer in need of avoid-
ance. In these situations, many courts have held that reopening a case in
order to administer an asset relieves the trustee of the statute of
limitations.338
The doctrine of equitable tolling, frequently understood as being
involuntary transfer of the debtor's interest in property made within two years of the bankruptcy
petition and made "with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any entity to which the debtor
was or became [indebted], on or after the date that such transfer was made." Id. § 548(a)(1)(A).
If the "transfer" of the debtor's interest in the lawsuit were not considered transferred post-petition
(or at the exact moment of the petition), and if the debtor has the fraudulent intent the courts so
frequently infer, § 548 would permit avoidance of the transfer.
The second kind of fraudulent transfer is the constructively fraudulent transfer. This sort
covers any voluntary or involuntary transfer of the debtor's interest in property made within two
years of the bankruptcy petition, while the debtor was insolvent, and for which the debtor received
less than reasonably equivalent value. Id. § 548(a)(1)(B). If the "transfer" of the debtor's interest
in the lawsuit is not considered transferred post-petition (or at the exact moment of the petition),
and if the debtor was insolvent at the time of the transfer, § 548 would permit avoidance of the
transfer, because it could not truly be said the plaintiff/debtor received reasonably equivalent (or
any) value for the transfer.
334. Brassfield v. Jack McLendon Furniture, Inc., 953 F. Supp. 1424, 1432 (M.D. Ala. 1996).
335. 11 U.S.C. § 550(a).
336. Id. § 549(d).
337. See, e.g., Bumes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 291 F.3d 1282 (11 th Cir. 2002); Barger v. City
of Cartersville, Ga., 348 F.3d 1289 (11 th Cir. 2003).
338. E.g., Gross v. Petty (In re Petty), 93 B.R. 208 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1988).
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applicable to federal statutes of limitation, 339 perhaps sheds some light
on the statute of limitations issue. In order to invoke equitable tolling,
the trustee must show: (1) wrongful concealment by the defendant of its
actions; (2) failure of the trustee to discover, within the limitations
period, the operative facts that are the basis of the avoidance action; and
(3) trustee's due diligence until such facts are discovered.34 ° Interest-
ingly, the requirements for equitable tolling are similar to those for
reopening a case: Both require demonstrating a need to administer an
asset wrongfully concealed by the debtor and a failure by the trustee to
discover that asset after diligent efforts to do so.
It could be argued, however, that equitable tolling requires conceal-
ment by the defendant, whereas reopening may be based on concealment
by the debtor. It is not necessarily impossible, however, to show con-
cealment by the defendant. In the judicial estoppel cases, the defendant/
employer knows of the bankruptcy, understands that the trustee is the
real party in interest, and asks the district court for relief, but does not
notify the trustee of the pending action. Moreover, the defendant/
employer might move for dismissal based on judicial estoppel in an
effort to keep the action concealed from the trustee. 341  Even if it were
not possible to show concealment by a particular defendant, most bank-
ruptcy courts do not require concealment by the defendant, but rather
permit concealment by the debtor to satisfy the first element of equitable
estoppel.342
c. Chapter 13 Cases
Although reopening a Chapter 7 case to permit the trustee to exer-
cise statutory avoidance powers is an appropriate method of addressing
339. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113 (2002); Young v. United States,
535 U.S. 43, 49-50 (2002); Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 397 (1946); Veltri v. Bldg.
Serv. 32b-J Pension Fund, 393 F.3d 318, 322 (2d Cir. 2004); Williams v. Sims, 390 F.3d 958, 960
(7th Cir. 2004).
340. E.g., Jarrett v. Kassel, 972 F.2d 1415, 1424 n.6 (6th Cir. 1992).
341. It is at least conceivable that a defendant might go to great enough lengths to conceal the
action from the trustee that the defendant might commit a bankruptcy crime. It is a crime, for
instance, to "knowingly and fraudulently conceal[ ] from a custodian, trustee, marshal, or other
officer of the court charged with the control or custody of property, or, in connection with a case
under title 11, from creditors or the United States Trustee, any property belonging to the estate of
a debtor." 18 U.S.C. § 152(1) (2000). Likewise, it is a crime to "knowingly and fraudulently
receiv[e] any material amount of property from a debtor after the filing of a case under title 11,
with intent to defeat the provisions of title 11.- Id. § 152(5). It is at least conceivable that a
defendant might deprive the estate of the value of the chose in action with the requisite intent.
342. Kearns Motor Co. v. Cimino (In re Dreiling), 233 B.R. 848, 878 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1999);
Ramette v. Range Mental Health Ctr., Inc. (In re Russ), 1997 WL 188449, at *3-4 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 1997); Moratzka v. Pomaville (In re Pomaville), 190 B.R. 632, 637 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1995); Martin v. Butcher (In re Butcher), 72 B.R. 247, 251 n.5 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1987). But see
Mediators, Inc. v. Manney (In re Mediators, Inc.), 190 B.R. 515, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
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an unscheduled and dismissed lawsuit, such a remedy would be unsuita-
ble under Chapter 13. The reasons for the inapplicability of this reme-
dial measure are twofold. First, a case filed pursuant to Chapter 13 is
not closed while the debtor is completing his or her plan. Precisely
because the case is not closed, there is no impediment to the pursuit of
an unauthorized post-petition transfer. While courts are divided as to
whether a Chapter 13 debtor mayexercise the trustee's avoidance pow-
ers, 343 someone would have standing to exercise such powers, whether it
be the debtor or the Chapter 13 trustee. 3 " On the other hand, it is not as
clear in Chapter 13 cases as it is in Chapter 7 cases that there would
even be an unauthorized post-petition transfer to avoid. Because § 1306
provides that a Chapter 13 debtor "shall remain in possession of all
property of the estate"34 and because § 1303 provides that the debtor
has the power to use, sell, and lease estate property,346 most courts have
held that the debtor has standing to commence a pre-petition cause of
action. 347 The debtor's right to pursue the action would, thus, largely
vitiate any claim that the disposition of the action was unauthorized.
Second, the analysis appropriate to Chapter 7 cases fits poorly in
the Chapter 13 context because repayment to creditors is not solely a
function of, nor is it limited to, property of the estate. Once the Chapter
13 plan is confirmed, it does not matter whether the lawsuit is included
in the estate, as the value to be received by creditors is determined by
343. Some courts hold that the Chapter 13 debtor may exercise the avoidance powers in the
same manner and to the same degree as a trustee. See Houston v. Eiler (In re Cohen), 305 B.R.
886, 900 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2004); Thacker v. United Cos. Lending Corp., 256 B.R. 724, 728 (W.D.
Ky. 2000); Freeman v. Eli Lilly Fed. Credit Union (In re Freeman), 72 B.R. 850, 855 (Bankr. E.D.
Va. 1987); In re Weaver, 69 B.R. 554, 556 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1987); Ottaviano v. Sorokin &
Sorokin, P.C. (In re Ottaviano), 68 B.R. 238, 240 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1986); Einoder v. Mount
Greenwood Bank (In re Einoder), 55 B.R. 319, 322-23 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1985). Others hold that
due to the absence of express statutory authority, Chapter 13 debtors may not exercise those
powers. See Realty Portfolio, Inc. v. Hamilton (In re Hamilton), 125 F.3d 292, 297-98 (5th Cir.
1997); In re Binghi, 299 B.R. 300, 303-04 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003); Kildow v. EMC Mortg. Corp.
(In re Kildow), 232 B.R. 686, 692-93 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1999); LaBarge v. Benda (In re
Merrifield), 214 B.R. 362, 364-65 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 1997); Barclays Am./Mortg. Corp. v.
Wilkinson (In re Wilkinson), 186 B.R. 186, 191-92 (Bankr. D. Md. 1995); In re Redditt, 146 B.R.
693, 701 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 1992); In re Perry, 131 B.R. 763, 768-69 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991);
Bruce v. Republic Bank-S. Austin (In re Bruce), 96 B.R. 717, 721-22 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989).
344. Ryker v. Current (In re Ryker), 315 B.R. 664, 670 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2004) (stating "the
ability of the Chapter 13 trustee to employ the avoidance powers" is "clear").
345. 11 U.S.C. § 1306(b) (2000).
346. Id. § 1303.
347. E.g., Cable v. Ivy Tech State Coil., 200 F.3d 467, 472-74 (7th Cir. 1999); Olick v. Parker
& Parsley Petroleum Co., 145 F.3d 513, 515 (2d Cir. 1998); Mar. Elec. Co., Inc. v. United Jersey
Bank, 959 F.2d 1194, 1209 n.2 (3d Cir. 1991); Looney v. Hyundai Motor Mfg. Ala., LLC, 330 F.
Supp. 2d 1289 (M.D. Ala. 2004). But see Am. Gen. Fin., Inc. v. Tippins (In re Tippins), 221 B.R.
11 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1998); Davis v. Victor Warren Props., Inc. (In re Davis), 216 B.R. 898, 902-
03 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1997).
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the plan and not by the value of the estate.348 This, however, does not
mean that there is no way for the value of the unscheduled asset to be
channeled to creditors.
Although bankruptcy-based judicial estoppel is more consistent
with Chapter 13 than with Chapter 7, it is actually less necessary in
Chapter 13 than in Chapter 7 becauge of the bankruptcy court's ability to
make corrections either before the plan is confirmed or while the con-
firmed plan is pending. The methods for chastising a Chapter 13 debtor
who has omitted an asset, while somewhat more limited than would be
the case under Chapter 7, are nevertheless ample: (1) refusal to confirm
a plan for failure to comply with the other provisions of Title 11 ;349 (2)
modification of the plan after which the debtor may dismiss or con-
vert; 350 (3) revocation of a plan procured by fraud;35 or (4) conversion
of the case to Chapter 7 because of failure to file the requisite § 521(1)
information, because of revocation of confirmation, because of refusal to
confirm, or otherwise "for cause.1352  However, there is no statutory
basis to deny a discharge in a Chapter 13 case based on bad behavior. In
any case, dismissal or conversion is likely, either by the debtor or at the
request of a creditor or United States Trustee.
In addition, bankruptcy courts may modify the Chapter 13 plan in
order to police debtor omissions.353 Where the debtor is permitted to
continue an unscheduled lawsuit and recover a judgment, there is
authority for the proposition that the trustee and creditors may seek to
modify a plan so that any proceeds awarded are devoted to repaying
creditors. 354  There is, however, considerable disagreement as to the
binding or preclusive effect of an order confirming a Chapter 13 plan
and the grounds for its modification.3 55 Furthermore, there is disagree-
348. See supra notes 243-250 and accompanying text.
349. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a).
350. Id. § 1329.
351. Id. § 1330(a).
352. Id. § 1307(c).
353. For a Chapter 13 plan to be confirmed it must satisfy several requirements, the two most
important of which are the "liquidation test" and the "disposable income test." Pursuant to the
liquidation test, the plan must provide an unsecured creditor with an allowed claim a payment that
is at least equal to the present value of the amount that creditor would be entitled to receive in a
Chapter 7 case. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). Under the "disposable income" test, the debtor must
devote the excess of her income over her reasonable and necessary living expenses to the
repayment of creditors. Id. § 1325(b).
354. See, e.g., In re Studer, 237 B.R. 189 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1998).
355. Some courts require the trustee or creditor seeking modification to show an unanticipated
change of circumstances. See, e.g., Arnold v. Weast (In re Arnold), 869 F.2d 240, 243 (4th Cir.
1989). Others require a lesser showing. See, e.g., Barbosa v. Solomon, 235 F.3d 31, 41 (1st Cir.
2000) (determining that a party seeking modification must advance a legitimate reason authorized
under § 1329); In re Witkowski, 16 F.3d 739, 744 (7th Cir. 1994) (requiring no showing of
changed circumstances); Ledford v. Brown (In re Brown), 219 B.R. 191, 194 (B.A.P. 6th Cir.
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ment as to whether a court, in determining whether to modify a plan,
should re-apply the disposable income test 3 56 even though this limitation
would have little effect on the court's ability to capture the value of the
damage award for the benefit of creditors.357 The district court's appli-
cation of judicial estoppel clearly interferes with this bankruptcy
remedy.358
Finally, Chapter 13 permits the bankruptcy court to revoke its order
of confirmation, if such order was procured by fraud, within 180 days
after the order was entered.359 Once the confirmation is revoked, one of
three things must happen: (1) the debtor must modify the plan to include
the unscheduled lawsuit, thereby complying with the liquidation test; (2)
the court must dismiss the Chapter 13 bankruptcy case; or (3) the court
must convert the Chapter 13 case to a Chapter 7 case.3 60 Where the
court opts to convert the case to Chapter 7, the Chapter 7 estate,
although created on the date of conversion, includes all of the property
that was previously in the Chapter 13 estate at the time the petition was
filed, which includes the lawsuit. Application of judicial estoppel would
thus deprive the Chapter 7 trustee of the value of that asset from the very
beginning of the Chapter 7 case. Moreover, if the creditors in the Chap-
ter 7 case fail to receive the amount they were entitled to under the
hypothetical liquidation that initially made the debtor's confirmation
fraudulent, it is futile to revoke that confirmation. Applying judicial
estoppel to unscheduled assets in Chapter 13 cases, therefore, interferes
with the bankruptcy court's statutorily mandated methods of addressing
debtor misconduct.
In one exchange between Captain Jack Sparrow and Will Turner,
the latter complains, "You didn't beat me. You ignored the rules of
engagement. In a fair fight, I'd kill you." '3 6 1 Sparrow replied, "That's
1998) (holding that an unanticipated change of circumstances is not necessary to plan
modification).
356. Some authorities indicate that the debtor's ability to pay should be re-examined for
purposes of plan modification. Barbosa, 235 F.3d at 40-41; 3 HENRY J. SOMMER, COLLIER
BANKRutFrcy MANUAL 1329.03 (3d ed. rev. 2005). Others state that the disposable income test
should not be applied in the context of modification. See, e.g., Forbes v. Forbes (In re Forbes),
215 B.R. 183, 191 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 1997); In re Sounakhene, 249 B.R. 801, 804-05 (Bankr. S.D.
Cal. 2000). See generally 2 KEITH M. LUNDIN, CHAPTER 13 BANKRuprcy § 6.45 (2d ed. 1994).
357. See Chapman, supra note 248, at 810. Re-application of the liquidation test is able to
capture any difference between the amounts calculated in the hypothetical liquidation analysis as
of the original confirmation and modification dates.
358. Even if the precedent that is binding on a given bankruptcy court would prevent
modification of the plan, it is curious that courts that apply judicial estoppel against the Chapter 13
debtor-plaintiffs do not consider the issue.
359. 11 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (2000).
360. Id. § 1330(b).
361. PIRATES, supra note 1.
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not much incentive for me to fight fair, then, is it?" 362 Bankruptcy law,
on the other hand, clearly provides a number of incentives to fight fairly.
The Bankruptcy Code and related laws provide a wide variety of reme-
dies for debtors who break the rules of bankruptcy. Ordinarily, the rem-
edies for failure to disclose assets are denial or revocation of
discharge363 and criminal prosecution,364 and, most importantly for the
estate and creditors, transference of any such assets to the trustee who
subsequently learns of them.365 Another penalty frequently visited upon
a debtor who fails to disclose assets is to deny the debtor the right to
amend a claim of exemptions, 366  which presupposes that any
unscheduled asset is property of the estate and has been ordered turned
over to the trustee for administration.
V. WRONG AS A MATrER OF PROCEDURE
Will Turner: You knew William Turner?
Pintel: Old Bootstrap, we knew him. It never sat well
with Bootstrap what we did to Jack Sparrow, the mutiny
and all. That's why he sent off a piece of the treasure
to you, as it were. He said we deserved to be cursed
... and remain cursed.
Ragetti: Stupid blighter.
Gibbs: Good man.
Pintel: But as you can imagine, that didn't sit too well
with the captain. So, what the captain did, he strapped a
cannon to Bootstrap's bootstraps.
Ragetti: Bootstrap's bootstraps.
Pintel: The last we saw of old Bill Turner he was sink-
ing to the crushing black oblivion of Davey Jones'
locker. Of course, it was only after that we learned we
needed his blood to lift the curse.
Ragetti: I guess that's what you call ironic.367
A. In General
The Ninth Circuit case of Dunmore v. United States,36 8 which
involved a tax refund action omitted from a debtor's schedules, demon-
strates a procedural alternative to the use of judicial estoppel. In 1993,
362. Id.
363. See, e.g., United States v. Cluck, 87 F.3d 138 (5th Cir. 1996).
364. See, e.g., United States v. Levine, 970 F.2d 681 (10th Cir. 1992).
365. See, e.g., In re Santaella 298 B.R. 793 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2002); Roudebush v. Sharp (In re
Sharp), 244 B.R. 889 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2000).
366. E.g., In re Dipzinski, 234 B.R. 746, 748 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1999); see, e.g., In re Grogan,
300 B.R. 804 (Bankr. D. Utah 2003).
367. PIRATES, supra note 1.
368. 358 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 2004).
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the taxpayer sought refunds of overpayments for the 1989 and 1990 tax
years. 369 While this request was pending, the taxpayer filed a Chapter 7
petition in September 1995.37o He omitted the tax refund request from
his schedules, presumably because his tax attorney had told him that it
did not matter whether he scheduled the request because the bankruptcy
trustee would likely decline, and the taxpayer did not have the resources,
to pursue litigation.371 In October 1995, the IRS disallowed the refund
and issued a notice of deficiency for 1991.372 The taxpayer received his
discharge in February 1996 and soon thereafter the IRS issued notices of
deficiency for tax years 1987, 1992, and 1993.17' The IRS also
informed the taxpayer that the alleged deficiencies would exceed any
refund he might obtain.374
In October 1997, the taxpayer commenced a tax refund action in
district court; he amended his complaint and demanded a jury trial in
May 1998. 375 His amended complaint sought tax refunds for three pre-
petition tax years, a determination that the IRS violated the bankruptcy
discharge, a judgment quieting title against tax liens, and a permanent
injunction against the IRS.376 Eleven months later, the government
sought dismissal of the action on the basis that the unscheduled and
unadministered assets remained property of the estate and, therefore, the
taxpayer neither owned the claims nor had prudential standing to assert
them.377
Because the statute of limitations on the refund action had run,378 a
dismissal would have prevented the refiling of the action. The taxpayer
asked the district court to exercise its bankruptcy jurisdiction and reopen
his bankruptcy case, which would allow him to seek abandonment of the
assets.3 79 Instead, the district court transferred the tax action to the
bankruptcy court. 380 Before the bankruptcy judge, the trustee expressed
no interest in pursuing the tax claims; the bankruptcy judge ordered the
trustee to abandon the claims and considered the abandonment to have
369. Id. at 1109.
370. Id.
371. Id.
372. Id. at 1109-10.
373. Id. at 1110.
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Id.
377. Id. The taxpayer did not assert in the lower courts that the government waived its
objection to his prudential standing and the Ninth Circuit held that the taxpayer's objection was
itself therefore waived. Id. at 1110 n.1.
378. See 26 C.F.R. § 301.6532-1(a) (2003) (providing a two-year limitation period).
379. Dunmore, 358 F.3d at 1110.
380. Id.
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"cured Dunmore's lack of standing. '"381
Although the district court judge apparently assumed the tax litiga-
tion would be tried in the district court following the bankruptcy trus-
tee's decision to abandon the claims, the litigation continued in the
bankruptcy court even after the trustee abandoned the estate's interest.382
After the debtor missed a status conference and the bankruptcy judge
scheduled the case for trial, the debtor sought to have the case returned
to the district court on the grounds that the bankruptcy judge lacked
jurisdiction over the abandoned claims. The government sought dismis-
sal for failure to prosecute, and when the debtor was unprepared to pro-
ceed with trial on the scheduled date, the bankruptcy judge dismissed the
refund claims for failure to prosecute.383
Much of the Ninth Circuit's opinion addresses the propriety of the
dismissal for failure to prosecute and is not directly relevant to the issue
of judicial estoppel. The balance of the opinion is useful, however, to
illustrate that there are procedures available to address the omission of a
cause of action and to ensure that the valuable asset is preserved so that
its value can be realized for the benefit of the common pool. Moreover,
the Ninth Circuit opinion approves the use of these procedures as a
means of avoiding the use of judicial estoppel. 384
Judicial estoppel is a court-created doctrine of uncertain moorings.
The United States Supreme Court only recently applied the doctrine for
the first time in New Hampshire v. Maine,385 and noted that "[t]he cir-
cumstances under which judicial estoppel may appropriately be invoked
are probably not reducible to any general formulation or principle. 386
As a general matter, it applies when a litigant is successful in maintain-
ing one position in one lawsuit, and then takes an inconsistent position
in a second lawsuit. 387 While the doctrine was developed "to protect the
integrity of the judicial process ... by prohibiting parties from deliber-
ately changing positions according to the exigencies of the moment,"38
the Court also noted that it especially applies in situations in which the
contrary position is "'to the prejudice of the party who has acquiesced in
381. Id. at 1110-11.
382. Id. at 1111.
383. Id.
384. Id. at 1113 n.3.
385. See Kira A. Davis, Judicial Estoppel and Inconsistent Positions of Law Applied to Fact
and Pure Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 191, 194 (2003) (noting this case as the first official
acknowledgment of the doctrine).
386. New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 750 (2001).
387. See id. at 749; 18B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4477 (2d ed. 2002).
388. New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 749-50.
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the position formerly taken by him."' 389
In determining whether to apply judicial estoppel, the Court in New
Hampshire listed the following three considerations: (1) whether a
party's later position was clearly inconsistent with its earlier position;
(2) "whether the party ha[d] succeeded in persuading a court to accept
that party's earlier position, [such] that judicial acceptance of an incon-
sistent position in a later proceeding [created] the perception that either
the first or the second court was misled;" and (3) whether the party seek-
ing to assert an inconsistent position would derive an unfair advantage
or impose an unfair detriment on the opposing party if not estopped. 390
In the context of bankruptcy proceedings, courts invoking judicial estop-
pel to dismiss a subsequent claim by a plaintiff/debtor have effectively
eliminated the third requirement. However, there does not appear to be
any obvious justification for that elimination. Indeed, in an employment
discrimination action, the courts' refusals to invoke the third considera-
tion results in a windfall to potentially discriminatory employers.
Furthermore, a straightforward New Hampshire analysis reveals
that many of the cases described above may in fact not be appropriate
candidates for judicial estoppel. Beginning with the first element, it is
unclear how an omission of the type at issue in these cases is "clearly
inconsistent" with an affirmative position taken in the employment dis-
crimination case. Assuming that the debtor is making an affirmative
statement about existing potential claims, and that the court relies on
such statement, it is unclear whether the debtor understands this to
include their pending EEOC charge or potential employment discrimina-
tion claim. For example, the debtor's bankruptcy counsel may advise
the debtor not to list the claim. While it may be more difficult to argue
around application of judicial estoppel in situations in which the debtor
has already filed an employment discrimination lawsuit, even these
cases are not exactly like taking an affirmative inconsistent position,
such as that taken by the state of New Hampshire during its litigation
with Maine. 391 In that case, New Hampshire entered into a consent
judgment whereby it agreed that the border between New Hampshire
and Maine would be split down the main navigational channel of the
river that divided the two states. 392 Having agreed to that, New Hamp-
shire was estopped to argue later that it owned all the way to the Maine
side of the river.393 Thus, unlike debtors engaged in bankruptcy pro-
389. Id. at 749 (quoting Davis v. Wakelee, 156 U.S. 680, 689 (1895)).
390. Id. at 750-51.
391. See id. at 749.
392. Id. at 750.
393. Id. at 751.
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ceedings, New Hampshire made affirmative statements about its
position.
Indeed, the second consideration suggests that the Court is looking
for affirmative statements of positions by the party against whom estop-
pel is asserted. As was explained in New Hampshire, "courts regularly
inquire whether the party has succeeded in persuading a court to accept
that party's earlier position, so that judicial acceptance of an inconsistent
position in a later proceeding would create 'the perception that either the
first or the second court was misled.' ,,394 The Court further explained
that "[a]bsent success in a prior proceeding, a party's later inconsistent
position introduces no 'risk of inconsistent court determinations' and
thus poses little threat to judicial integrity. 395 One might ask whether
there can be any "persuasion" afoot when the debtor has in fact asserted
nothing. What does "success" mean in this context? If the trustee never
would have pursued the claim (i.e., would have abandoned it), in what
practical way has the bankruptcy court been misled?
396
However, courts have not taken such a plaintiff/debtor friendly
view. Indeed, in Hamilton v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 39 7 the
court invoked judicial estoppel even though the bankruptcy court ulti-
mately did not enter a discharge in bankruptcy, but instead dismissed the
bankruptcy petition.398 The court still held the plaintiff/debtor responsi-
ble for his failure to disclose his potential claim against his insurance
company, in spite of Hamilton's argument that, without the discharge,
the bankruptcy court could not have relied on his schedules. 399 The court
stated that "[t]he bankruptcy court may 'accept' the debtor's assertions
by relying on the debtor's nondisclosure of potential claims in many
ways." 4° ° Similarly, in Cunningham v. Reliable Concrete Pumping,
Inc.,4°" a Washington state court used judicial estoppel to stop a plaintiff
from pursuing a personal injury case, even though his bankruptcy case
was reopened.4 °2 Relying on Hamilton, the court reasoned that Cun-
ningham benefited from the initial discharge, even if the bankruptcy
case was subsequently reopened.40 3
394. Id. at 750.
395. Id. at 750-51 (citation omitted).
396. Interestingly, at least one court has suggested that courts may still apply judicial estoppel
where a bankruptcy is reopened for purposes of amending the filings to add the claim, yet the
trustee eventually abandons the claim. See In re Upshur, 317 B.R. 446 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2004).
397. 270 F.3d 778 (9th Cir. 2001).
398. Id. at 784.
399. Id.
400. Id.
401. 108 P.3d 147 (Wash. App. 2005).
402. Id.
403. Id.
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Still, it makes sense for courts to encourage honesty in debtors by
penalizing what may be characterized as "lies of omission." However, a
third consideration militates against the use of judicial estoppel in this
context, particularly in situations in which the trustee has expressed an
interest in attempting to gather assets from the employment discrimina-
tion case to pay the debtor's creditors, or has stated that he would not
have pursued the claim. "A third consideration is whether the party
seeking to assert an inconsistent position would derive an unfair advan-
tage or impose an unfair detriment on the opposing party if not
estopped."'4 ° The opposing party here, the potentially discriminating
employer, is in no way placed in an unfair advantage if the plaintiff/
debtor is not estopped. Indeed, the employer essentially is the recipient
of a windfall: Judicial estoppel provides an automatic defense to poten-
tially discriminatory employers who just happen to encounter an
employee who had financial misfortunes that forced him or her into
bankruptcy. While punishing the plaintiff/debtor in this manner argua-
bly may lead to increased debtor candor and therefore integrity in the
bankruptcy system,40 5 it undermines another important area of law that
is at issue in these cases-employment discrimination law.
The Supreme Court in New Hampshire noted that the concept of
judicial estoppel was flexible and that "[a]dditional considerations may
inform the doctrine's application in specific factual contexts. 4 °6 An
obvious important consideration in these cases that courts have left out
of their analysis is that potential discriminating employers-entities that
were not parties to the bankruptcy proceedings-are unfairly being let
off the hook, which in some cases not only means that a victim of dis-
crimination is not compensated, but also that these employers are free to
continue their discrimination. This result undermines the purposes of
Title VII, which are to make victims whole and to deter employers from
discriminating.4 °7 Indeed, given the alacrity with which courts are will-
ing to dismiss these cases under the auspices of judicial estoppel, it is of
small surprise that employment defense attorneys, a relatively prosper-
ous group of lawyers with ample resources, have taken advantage of this
tool.4" 8 It is of equally small surprise that defense publications have
404. New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 751 (2001).
405. We use the term "arguably" here because it is unclear whether many of these debtors
really intended to deceive the bankruptcy court. Instead, they appear to be rather unsophisticated
litigants who are victims of poor advice by bankruptcy counsel.
406. New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 751.
407. THERESA M. BEINER, GENDER MYTHS v. WORKING REALIEs: USING SOCIAL SCIENCE TO
REFORMULATE SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 175-76 (2005).
408. Cf Carol McHugh Sanders, Current Decisions, 69 DEF. COUNS. J. 355, 359-61 (2002)
(detailing the successful use of judicial estoppel to stop a plaintiff/debtor from pursuing damages
against his former employer based on an employment discrimination case).
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informed these lawyers of this easy way out of employment discrimina-
tion lawsuits.4 °9 Indeed, discovery-taking tips for employment defense
counsel already include determining if the plaintiff has filed
bankruptcy.4"'
Yet, in the one case in which the United States Supreme Court
could have used judicial estoppel against an employment discrimination
plaintiff, the Court chose not to do so, instead holding that employment
discrimination plaintiffs could, under appropriate circumstances, take
inconsistent (or potentially inconsistent) positions.41' In Cleveland v.
Policy Management Systems Corp., the Court addressed whether a plain-
tiff could simultaneously make a claim for social security disability ben-
efits and a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act, which
included an allegation that the plaintiff could work with reasonable
accommodations.4" 2 The Court concluded that a plaintiff could do so,
but had to proffer a sufficient explanation for the discrepancy.4"3 The
Court suggested that judicial estoppel may not apply, because the two
positions are not necessarily mutually exclusive, given the differing
legal standards under each claim.414 The Court therefore did not see this
as a purely factual conflict, such as might be the case with a plaintiff/
debtor's representations in bankruptcy. So, while this case is not
directly on point, it does demonstrate the Court's reluctance to dismiss
employment discrimination plaintiff's claims without permitting them to
explain their potentially inconsistent conduct in multiple proceedings.
B. Judicial Estoppel as an End-Run Around the Rules of
Preclusion and Joinder
It is useful to determine whether either of the preclusion doctrines
would apply in bankruptcy/discrimination judicial estoppel cases. In the
standard factual scenario in which an individual files a Chapter 7 bank-
ruptcy case and omits a pending employment discrimination lawsuit or
charge, claim preclusion cannot apply because the discrimination claim
has not been adjudicated at all. Although claim preclusion includes
causes of action that could have been brought, the underlying claim
itself-the employment discrimination claim-must in some way be
decided.41 ' Issue preclusion will rarely apply for the simple reason that
409. See id.
410. See, e.g., Zachary D. Fasman, Taking the Plaintiff's Deposition - the Defense Viewpoint,
712 PLI/Lrr 513, 521-22 (2004).
411. Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795 (1999).
412. Id. at 797.
413. Id. at 806.
414. Id. at 802-03.
415. See supra notes 279-286 and accompanying text.
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the issue of the debtor's ownership of the chose in action will not have
been litigated in the prior action.41 6
Dismissal against the debtor, however, is not all that a defendant
wants. Indeed, dismissal against the debtor that is not binding on the
trustee is of little benefit to the defendant. However, issue preclusion is
even less appropriate against the trustee than it is against the debtor.
Non-mutual defensive issue preclusion is bound by the due process
clause, which prohibits precluding in the second action those litigants
who "have never had a chance to present their evidence and arguments
on the claim."'4 17 Given the Chapter 7 trustee's lack of knowledge of the
claim, and the adversarial position the trustee would take against a
debtor's assertion that she had no prepetition rights in a prepetition
action in which she was plaintiff, the trustee could not be estopped. Fur-
thermore, where the trustee is not made a party to the employment dis-
crimination claim, the trustee is not bound by or precluded by the
judgment in that action.418
Given that the trustee cannot properly be precluded from bringing
the same claim, it is reasonable to ask what benefit there is to entering
judgment against the debtor. Why would a defendant want, and why
would a district court grant, judgment that will not fully dispose of the
litigation? Presumably, the defendant would prefer an adjudication that
will prevent re-litigation. And presumably the court would prefer the
same.
The defendant's interest in obtaining a judgment that would be
preclusive against both the debtor and the trustee suggests the defendant
would want to invoke Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17, which pro-
vides for the joinder of the real party in interest. Most courts regard the
trustee as the real party in interest of prepetition claims that have not
been abandoned.419 According to the 1966 advisory committee notes,
"the modem function of [Rule 17] in its negative aspect is simply to
protect the defendant against a subsequent action by the party actually
entitled to recover, and to insure generally that the judgment will have
its proper effect as res judicata."42 The district court might therefore
reasonably interpret the defendant's assertion that the suit is an
416. This leaves aside any problems of privity. In addition to the same claim, there must also
be the same party for claim preclusion to apply. Once again, the defendant/employer was not
before the bankruptcy court, and therefore there is no identity of parties.
417. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of I11. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971); accord
Ceres Terminals, Inc. v. Chicago City Bank and Trust Co., 635 N.E.2d 485, 497 (I11. App. Ct.
1994).
418. Ceres Terminals, Inc., 635 N.E.2d at 497.
419. See, e.g., Steger v. Gen. Elec. Co., 318 F.3d 1066, 1080-81 (11th Cir. 2003).
420. FED. R. Crv. P. 17 advisory committee's note.
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unscheduled asset of a Chapter 7 estate as a motion to dismiss under
Rule 17. Under Rule 17, however, dismissal would be inappropriate
before the trustee had been notified and given an opportunity for ratifi-
cation, joinder, or substitution.421 Instead, defendants often opt for a
procedural basis for dismissal that does not require notice to the trustee
and thus makes proceeding to a trial on the merits less likely. Further-
more, many district courts oblige defendants' requests for such
dismissal.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19, which governs the joinder of
necessary and indispensable parties, is also a well-established rule for
addressing the consequences of the absence of someone who should be
joined. It could be expected that a defendant would wish a bankruptcy
trustee to be joined in order that the defendant might have its liability
determined in a single action. It might also be reasonably expected that
the district court would favor adding the bankruptcy trustee once the
court learns the lawsuit is an unscheduled asset of a bankruptcy estate.
"Forcing inclusive joinder in this situation is aimed at ensuring that
courts do not enter partial or 'hollow' judgments - judgments that do
not effectively resolve the parties' entire controversy." '422 The "com-
plete relief' provision of Rule 19 is generally read narrowly as being
applicable only when the court cannot grant complete relief with respect
to those who are already parties; it is generally not read to require join-
der merely because an absent party might sue later.423 Given, however,
that the bankruptcy trustee could sue the defendant whether the defen-
dant won or lost, the bankruptcy trustee would seem to be a person
whose nonjoinder might leave the defendant "subject to a substantial
risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations
by reasons of the claimed interest." '424 Therefore, a reasonable defen-
dant would want its estoppel-based motion for summary judgment
treated as a Rule 19 motion.
But if Rule 19 joinder is not necessary for the benefit of either the
court or the defendant, it would seem to be necessary for the benefit of
the bankruptcy trustee. Rule 19 is applicable when the absentee who
claims an interest in the subject matter of the litigation "is so situated
421. See, e.g., Olexy v. Interstate Assurance Co., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1045 (S.D. Miss. 2000); cf
Feist v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 100 F. Supp. 2d 273, 279-80 (E.D. Pa. 1999), aff'd, 216 F.3d
1075 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that case could be dismissed where debtor did not make honest
mistake as to proper party). The court may substitute the bankruptcy trustee as the proper party
under Rule 25 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Bauer v. Commerce Union Bank, 859
F.2d 438, 440-42 (6th Cir. 1988).
422. 4 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 19.03[2][a] (3d ed. 2005).
423. Id. § 19.03[2][b][ii].
424. FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(2)(ii).
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that nonjoinder will threaten harm either to the absentee or to an extant
party. '4 25 The harm to the absentee party must be that, "as a practical
matter," the nonjoinder may "impair or impede the person's ability to
protect that interest. 4 26 Given, for example, that employers who suc-
cessfully invoke judicial estoppel argue that disposition based on judi-
cial estoppel is preclusive as to the trustee,427 the trustee would seem to
be a party whose interest in the subject matter of the litigation would, as
a practical matter, be impaired or impeded by a disposition and, there-
fore, a party to be joined if feasible.428 Of course, the applicability of
preclusion is not necessary for joinder under Rule 19, and if the trustee
is such a party, it is curious that dismissal occurs without consideration
of whether the trustee can be made a party.42 9
Some courts might be reluctant to order joinder of the trustee if the
debtor already adequately represents the trustee's interest. Although
Rule 19, unlike Rule 24, does not explicitly contain such a condition,
some courts have interpreted it as implicitly containing one, arguing that
the absent party's interest is not impaired or impeded if it is adequately
represented.430 The Ninth Circuit, which grafts an adequate representa-
tion clause into Rule 19(a)(2)(i), follows a strict standard. Whether a
party's interest is adequately represented by an extent party depends on
whether:
"the interests of a present party to the suit are such that it will
undoubtedly make all" of the absent party's arguments; whether the
party is "capable of and willing to make such arguments"; and
whether the absent party would "offer any necessary element to the
proceedings" that the present parties would neglect.43'
Few debtors to whom the district court imputes motives of manipu-
lating the bankruptcy court and deceiving the trustee could be expected
to make all of the trustee's arguments. If the debtor has attempted to
deceive the trustee, their interests are hardly identical. If, however, the
debtor failed to schedule the asset from ignorance of bankruptcy law, it
is unlikely that the plaintiff/debtor is expert enough to make the trustee's
arguments. Indeed, one problem the judicial estoppel cases generally
suffer from is that parties often fail to make arguments based on the
Bankruptcy Code and bankruptcy policy-a problem that would not
425. MOORE ET AL., supra note 422, § 19.03[4][a] (emphasis added).
426. FED. R. Cirv. P. 19(a)(2)(i).
427. See, e.g., Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 291 F.3d 1282 (1 1th Cir. 2002).
428. See, e.g., Takeda v. Nw. Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 765 F.2d 815, 821 (9th Cir. 1985).
429. See, e.g., Crook v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 34 F. Supp. 239-40 (W.D. Ky. 1940).
430. E.g., Washington v. Daley, 173 F.3d 1158, 1167-68 (9th Cir. 1999); Gwartz v. Jefferson
Mem'l Hosp. Ass'n, 23 F.3d 1426, 1429 (8th Cir. 1994).
431. Daley, 173 F.3d at 1167 (quoting Shermoen v. United States, 982 F.2d 1312, 1318 (9th
Cir. 1992).
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exist if more district courts were amenable to joining the trustee, or at
least, asking the trustee to file a brief or make an appearance.
The trustee, therefore, is likely a "necessary party." And the defen-
dant's motion in the district court, which asserts that there is or has been
a bankruptcy case, that the action is a prepetition asset of the estate, and
that the action was not listed as an asset on the debtor's schedules, tells
the district judge everything he or she needs to know to demonstrate that
an order under Rule 19 would be appropriate. Yet few, if any, courts
order joinder.
One explanation for this treatment of procedural rules as "more like
a set of guidelines than actual rules" might be found in the fact that some
defendants have been able to persuade courts that the plaintiff should be
judicially estopped; this is more easily accomplished if the trustee is not
a party to the discrimination action. And once the dismissal or summary
judgment has been obtained, those defendants have been able to per-
suade the courts that the judgment judicially estopping the plaintiff
should be preclusive against the trustee.432
Another reason, from the defendant's point of view, is that a judg-
ment that is preclusive against all persons who can be precluded requires
that all such persons be made parties. It is for this reason that the rules
of joinder are designed to facilitate adding anyone as a party who could
bring the action. But, since judicial estoppel is not properly applicable
against a trustee, defendants generally do not want them joined. Conse-
quently, an action in which the trustee has been made a party is one that
is more likely to proceed to adjudication on the merits. A defendant
would perhaps prefer that the trustee never find out about the action, or
find out after the statute of limitations has run for the trustee. Either
way, the defendant seeks to ensure that the trustee never realizes
whatever value the action may have.
To summarize, the defendant asserts as grounds for dismissal judi-
cial estoppel, which is a doctrine that depends on the notion of some
harm to the integrity of the judicial process, when the only person to
suffer any harm is the trustee. Judicial estoppel is the one method the
defendant has to obtain dismissal without causing the trustee to learn of
the harm or take steps to rectify that harm. In seeking dismissal, the
defendant invokes a doctrine predicated on the assumption that the first
court is unable to adjust the consequences of the first statement, even
though that court has a number of ways to do exactly that. And once the
defendant obtains dismissal based on that erroneous assumption, the
defendant then engages in egregious bootstrapping, arguing that the dis-
432. E.g., Burnes, 291 F.3d 1282.
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missal is binding on the trustee in a way that renders the procedures to
adjust the consequences ineffective. With the action conclusively dis-
missed, there is no basis for reopening the case to administer the asset,
and reopening the case is no basis for avoiding the preclusive effect of
the dismissal. Once the asset is thus put beyond the trustee's reach, the
curse cannot be lifted. The defendant has played fast and loose with the
courts and keeps the gold, all sanctioned by court order. "I guess that's
what you call ironic. 433
C. Judicial Estoppel Is Unnecessary When the First Case Is a
Bankruptcy Proceeding
Judicial estoppel, according to the courts that invoke it, is a doc-
trine that protects the integrity of the judicial process by requiring con-
sistency from each party. Old statements justifying the doctrine
emphasize that it "upholds the sanctity of an oath" by prohibiting one
who has sworn from "repudiating the [oath] when he thinks it to his
advantage to do SO." ' 43 4 Such statements tend to support the absolute
form of judicial estoppel, which precludes a person from maintaining a
position contrary to one previously maintained in a judicial proceeding
whether or not the court accepted the position.435 More recent state-
ments are similar, although they emphasize the integrity of the judicial
system over the integrity of the oath and, therefore, tend to support the
version of judicial estoppel that applies when the first court has accepted
the prior position of the party to be estopped.4 36 If that party were per-
mitted to take a contrary position, and if the second court were to accept
it, the inconsistent results would make it glaringly apparent that one
court or the other would be wrong.
Under the current majority view, the doctrine does not address
inconsistency within the same case, nor would it serve much utility if it
were employed within a single case, because the right of parties to plead
"in the alternative" largely vitiates any intra-case consistency require-
ment.43 7 As one court has put it, "before being deemed to be 'playing
fast and loose,' a party must attempt to invoke the authority of one tribu-
433. PIRATES, supra note 1.
434. T.H. Malone, The Tennessee Law of Judicial Estoppel, I TENN. L. REV. 1, 1 (1922);
accord Note, The Doctrine of Preclusion Against Inconsistent Positions in Judicial Proceedings,
supra note 281, at 1133.
435. See BOYERS, supra note 273, at 1245-46.
436. See New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749-50 (2001).
437. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(2); United States v. Newell, 239 F.3d 917, 921 (7th Cir. 2001);
United States v. Levasseur, 846 F.2d 786, 793 (1st Cir. 1988); Cayuga Indian Nation of N.Y. v.
Pataki, 188 F. Supp. 2d 223, 234 (N.D.N.Y. 2002); Bd. of Educ. of Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No.
204 v. Du Page County Election Comm'n, 793 N.E.2d 954, 957 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003); Note,
Judicial Estoppel: The Refurbishing of a Judicial Shield, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 409, 420 (1987)
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nal to override or flout a bargain made with another." '438 Clearly, in a
single case it cannot ordinarily be said that the court has yet accepted
any given position.
Judicial estoppel does address inconsistency between cases. As
demonstrated, however, it serves little purpose with respect to inter-case
inconsistency because of the existence of the preclusion doctrines. And
to the extent that judicial estoppel has effect beyond the preclusion doc-
trines, its use may negate the limits on those doctrines. Its use, there-
fore, should be limited so as to prevent an end-run around the limits of
the preclusion doctrines.
There may be circumstances of inter-case inconsistency that would
not otherwise fall under one of the preclusion doctrines and should
nonetheless be prohibited in the second case. However, instances in
which the first case is a bankruptcy case, and the debtor's position in the
first case is the omission of an asset will rarely provide such instances.
VI. ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF JUDICIAL HOSTILITY TO EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
Some would argue that the use of judicial estoppel in these bank-
ruptcy/discrimination cases amounts to yet another example of federal
judicial hostility to employment discrimination plaintiffs. Legal schol-
ars have charted perceived judicial hostility to employment discrimina-
tion plaintiffs in a variety of contexts.43 9 The use of judicial estoppel
and other procedural devices to undermine debtors' employment dis-
crimination claims could be viewed as yet another example of courts
reaching to rid themselves of what might very well be meritorious
claims without reaching the merits.
To begin with, studies have shown that plaintiffs in employment
discrimination cases fare poorly before both trial and appellate judges. 44
In a study of twenty-three categories of federal cases terminated in the
courts of appeals during 1988 to 1997, Clermont and Eisenberg found
that not only do win rates for plaintiffs and defendants differ apprecia-
(concluding that "judicial estoppel cannot be applied to inconsistent assertions made in the course
of a single trial" because rule 8(e)(2) expressly allows alternative pleadings).
438. Levasseur, 846 F.2d at 793.
439. See supra note 9; see, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont, Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J.
Schwab, How Employment-Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 7
EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 547 (2003); Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia
in the Appellate Courts: Civil Rights Really Do Differ from Negotiable Instruments, 2002 U. ILL.
L. REV. 947 (2002); Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfallfor Defendants,
34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 99, 109 (1999); Michael Selmi, Why are Employment Discrimination
Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555 (2001).
440. See, e.g., Clermont, Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 439; Clermont & Eisenberg, supra
note 439.
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bly, but the difference was largest in the civil rights category of "jobs,"
which includes employment discrimination claims.4"' As they explain
their findings:
In these cases, plaintiffs obtain appellate reversals of trial wins by
defendants in less than 6% of their appeals. In contrast, defendants
obtain appellate reversals in nearly 44% of their appeals. This differ-
ential is ... highly statistically significant. Another computation is
telling. For the 266 cases appealed by defendants with a decisive
appellate outcome, the 44% reversal rate is not statistically signifi-
cantly different from a 50% reversal rate. One cannot reject the
hypothesis that defendants win half their appeals." 2
Likewise, their study showed that plaintiffs won in 30% of the job
discrimination cases that were tried. However, on appeal, defendants
had a 43.61% reversal rate-the second highest reversal rate of all case
categories studied.443 The only category of cases that fared worse was
"other civil rights cases," which includes other types of discrimination
cases, first amendment cases, police misconduct cases, and the like."'
These high rates of reversal are particularly troubling, because employ-
ment discrimination cases often depend on the intent of the defendant, a
finding that is factual in nature and therefore "should be largely immune
from appellate reversal." 445 Of course, in cases in which courts apply
judicial estoppel, the courts never consider issues of intent or any other
arguments on the merits of an employment discrimination claim. Plain-
tiffs are per se barred from proceeding.
Plaintiff win rates have been particularly low for plaintiffs claiming
under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). Many of the cases
described above are ADA cases. A study by the American Bar Associa-
tion of Title I cases decided between 1992 and 1997 found that employ-
ers won 92% of such cases." 6 Likewise, in a study that included both
published and unpublished opinions, Professor Ruth Colker found that
employers prevailed at trial in 94% of cases, and on appeal in 84% of
cases in which the plaintiff appealed an adverse judgment. 447 Colker
made an effort to control for potential frivolous cases by deleting "frivo-
441. See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 439, at 957.
442. Id. at 957-58 (footnote omitted).
443. Id. at 958.
444. Id.
445. Id.
446. Am. Bar Ass'n, Study Finds Employers Win Most ADA Title I Judicial and Administrative
Complaints, 22 MENTAL & PHYsIcAL DISABILrrY L. REP. 403, 404 (1998).
447. Colker, supra note 439, at 107-08. Colker opines that defendant win rates at trial are
likely even higher, given that not all cases result in an obtainable opinion. Id. at 109.
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lous, unpublished opinions from the database. 448 She concluded, "both
the trial and appellate court processes yielded results that were not hos-
pitable to plaintiffs discrimination claims. ' ' "49 Thus, the chance of a
plaintiff winning an ADA case is especially bleak. Perhaps it is not
surprising that courts have added judicial estoppel to their arsenal for
dismissing these cases.
Given purported judicial attitudes, it is unsurprising that employ-
ment discrimination plaintiffs fare worse in front of judges than in front
of juries. In an early study of employment discrimination cases, Theo-
dore Eisenberg found that in cases tried between 1978 and 1985, plain-
tiffs won only 22% of the time.4 50 In comparing bench trials to jury
trials, plaintiffs won 42.6% of the time before juries, whereas they won
only 19.2% of the time before judges.4 51 This has led the Second Circuit
Task Force to opine that "one plausible explanation is that judges,
removed as they are from contact with the day-to-day operation of the
business world, are less sympathetic than jurors to the complexities of
current workplace relationships. 452
These findings are consistent with anecdotal evidence coming from
gender bias task forces. The Second Circuit Task Force explained that a
common perception from focus groups was that judges do not like
employment discrimination cases.453  Indeed, one judge actually
reported that "colleagues criticize the employment discrimination areas
as 'highly emotional,"' leading the judge to speculate that "highly emo-
tional might well be a code phrase for 'female." 4 4 The Task Force
suggested other reasons for the perceived judicial hostility to these
claims, including the fact that the plaintiffs often appear pro se, that the
cases are small and clog the docket, and that they exacerbate already
growing caseload problems. 455 Likewise, the Eighth Circuit's Gender
Fairness Task Force found that 29% of plaintiffs' counsel and 11% of
defense counsel reported indications from judges that discrimination
cases are undeserving of federal court resources. 456 The Special Com-
mittee on Gender to the D.C. Task Force reported that 26% of female
448. Id. at 106 (footnotes omitted). Interestingly, this resulted in fewer than a dozen cases
being eliminated from her data set. Id.
449. Id. at 108.
450. Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 1583.
451. Id. at 1591.
452. Report of the Working Committees to the Second Circuit Task Force on Gender, Racial
and Ethnic Fairness in the Courts, 1997 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 117, 345 (1997).
453. Id. at 342.
454. Id. at 343, 344.
455. Id. at 343.
456. Final Report and Recommendations of the Eighth Circuit Gender Fairness Task Force,
31 CREIGHTON L. REv. 9, 72-73 (1997).
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attorneys and 10% of male attorneys have observed a judge treat a gen-
der-based employment discrimination case as a waste of time, and 23%
of female attorneys and 14% of male attorneys similarly observed a
judge treat a race or national origin discrimination case as a waste of
time.457 In the Ninth Circuit, "focus group participants reported that
most federal district court judges before whom they had appeared are
less receptive to employment discrimination cases of all types than they
are to commercial cases with high monetary stakes." '458 Further, "[i]n
sexual harassment or discrimination cases before a male judge, plain-
tiffs lawyers report a minimization of their clients' trauma and 'an
across the board lack of understanding' as to the female plaintiff's situa-
tion and point of view.
Indeed, courts assessing judicial estoppel in this context misap-
prehend plaintiff motives in employment discrimination cases. Discus-
sion in the judicial estoppel cases focuses exclusively (to the extent it is
discussed at all) on the claim as an asset. While occasionally the courts
must consider other aspects of employment discrimination claims
because of a prayer for reinstatement, the primary concern is on the
claim as an asset reducible to money. Yet, often there are dignitary
harms related to employment discrimination lawsuits that go beyond
money damages. Plaintiffs often want their day in court and an adjudi-
cation that the employer engaged in wrongdoing. This sentiment was
summed up well by a sexual harassment plaintiff, who, after being ques-
tioned by a trial judge as to why she brought the lawsuit, never men-
tioned money damages:
Because I felt I needed to do something to get in control of the situa-
tion. I felt so humiliated and so downtrodden, that I needed a way to
overcome this. Urn, I wanted to set right what was wrong. I - I
wanted to, um, be able to have a chance to say what I felt was wrong;
what had been done to me, and the injustices I felt at the time. I - I
felt they were never addressed, and now is my chance to address
them. Whether I win or not, I'm still going to win in my heart,
because I was able to sit here and address the people that wronged
me.
460
However, judicial estoppel effectively bars the plaintiff from having her
day in court and from having the chance for a court to find the
457. Report of the Special Committee on Gender to the D.C. Circuit Task Force on Gender,
Race and Ethnic Bias, 84 GEO. L.J. 1657, 1759-63 n.151 (1995).
458. The Effects of Gender in the Federal Courts: The Final Report of the Ninth Circuit
Gender Bias Task Force: The Quality of Justice. 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 745, 885 (1994).
459. Id. at 887.
460. Catchpole v. Brannon, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 440, 447 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
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employer's actions wrong. In doing so, the doctrine fails to acknowl-
edge that employment discrimination claims are not just about money.
VII. CONCLUSION
Many defendants seek dismissal or summary judgment in employ-
ment discrimination actions that should have been, but were not, listed
as assets by a plaintiff who has filed bankruptcy, asserting that the plain-
tiff/debtor should be judicially estopped from pursuing the action after
having failed to acknowledge ownership of the asset. District courts
should refuse to acquiesce to these requests. The appropriateness of
judicial estoppel depends on the bankruptcy court's acceptance of the
plaintiff/debtor's position, which it has not done, and on its lacking the
means of adjusting the bankruptcy case for the debtor's false statement,
which it does not lack. The Bankruptcy Code provides substantive and
procedural rules that safeguard for the bankruptcy creditors the value of
the lawsuit as an asset. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure counsel
for joinder of the trustee. Nonetheless, many courts apply judicial estop-
pel against the debtor and some have subsequently precluded the trustee
from pursuing the action. The district courts that employ judicial estop-
pel in this fashion are permitting a windfall to defendants who may be
manipulating the court system, even as such courts profess to be guard-
ing the judiciary against manipulation by the plaintiff/debtor. One is left
wondering whether the willingness to apply judicial estoppel, wrong as a
matter of bankruptcy law and wrong as a matter of procedure, reflects
judicial hostility toward discrimination plaintiffs.
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